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ABSTRACT 
 This Article analyzes patent mistakes—that is, mistakes made by the patent system 
when it decides whether a particular invention has met the patentability requirements. The-
se mistakes are inevitable. Given resource constraints, some might even be desirable. This 
Article evaluates the relative costs of patent mistakes, so that we can make better ones.  
 Three characteristics drive the costs of mistakes: their type (false positive or false nega-
tive), timing (early or late), and doctrinal basis (utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and so on). 
These characteristics make some mistakes more troubling than others.  
 This Article compares the costs of making mistakes of different types, at different times, 
and on different doctrinal bases. These comparisons produce some surprising results—for 
example, under certain plausible conditions, it will be better to wrongly refuse to grant a 
patent than to wrongly invalidate a patent that had already been granted. The conclusions 
here have important implications for persistent issues in patent law, including how closely 
courts should scrutinize the validity of issued patents and how the Patent and Trademark 
Office should allocate scarce enforcement resources. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The patent system makes many mistakes, frequently granting pa-
tents that should be denied and denying patents that should be 
granted.1 One approach is to introduce reforms aimed at reducing the 
rate of these mistakes.2 But even if these reforms are successful, mis-
takes are ultimately inevitable. A rate of zero mistakes is both unre-
alistic and undesirable.3  
 But not all mistakes are created equal. This Article thus asks: how 
should we get patent law wrong? In other words, given that the pa-
tent system will make some mistakes, which ones should we prefer? 
 The patent system includes two government institutions that 
evaluate patentability: the Patent and Trademark Office and the fed-
eral courts. The focus here is on the patent system’s mistaken appli-
                                                 
 1.  For examples of the rich literature emphasizing the desirability of getting things 
right more often, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & 
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS 
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); James 
Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES. MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44, 47, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/12/magazine/patently-absurd.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm; 
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Mark Lemley, Douglas 
Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents?, 28 REGULATION 10 (2005); 
Douglas Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before 
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); and John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent 
System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001). 
 2.  See, e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open 
Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2006) (arguing for mechanisms to 
allow public participation in patent examination so as to reduce the number of wrongly-
issued patents). 
 3.  See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that the costs of early mistakes are too low on average to justify 
the expense of avoiding all early mistakes).  
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cations of the patentability rules. These rules are a set of doctrines 
that the patent system uses to decide whether an inventor is entitled 
to a patent. Three characteristics might affect the costs of these mis-
takes. First, the mistakes might be false positives (incorrect grants of 
patents) or false negatives (incorrect denials of patents). Second, they 
might be made early, during the evaluation of the patent application, 
or late, during a challenge to an issued patent’s validity in infringe-
ment litigation. And third, they might be made with respect to any of 
the patentability rules: subject matter, utility, novelty, nonobvious-
ness, enablement, best mode, or definiteness.4  
 The goal of this Article is to provide a relative sense of how the 
costs of mistakes vary along with these three characteristics.5 A con-
clusive assessment depends on the resolution of difficult (perhaps 
intractable) empirical questions, but we can make some progress 
with the theoretical perspective taken here. The analysis leads to 
four general conclusions.  
 First, false positives on different doctrines will necessarily cause 
problems of different kinds. The costs of failing to detect violations of 
some rules will therefore be greater than the costs of failing to detect 
violations of others. The patent system’s failure to detect violations of 
the nonobviousness requirement, for example, will create patent 
thickets—areas in which there are many overlapping rights to an in-
vention. On the other hand, the patent system’s failure to detect vio-
lations of the enablement requirement will force the public to waste 
resources duplicating the inventor’s achievement. These two kinds of 
problems—overlapping rights and wasteful duplication—will natu-
rally impose costs of different magnitudes; they are, after all, differ-
ent kinds of problems. False positives on some doctrines will there-
fore be more costly than false positives on others. 
 Second, the timing of a false positive will affect its costs on a doc-
trine-by-doctrine basis. Late false positives necessarily follow early 
ones, so the analysis depends on the additional costs incurred when 
the patent system produces a late false positive after an early one. 
For some doctrines—like enablement and definiteness—late false 
positives will add little to the costs incurred because of the early false 
positive. For such doctrines, we should be (roughly) indifferent to late 
                                                 
 4.  I set aside written description for reasons set forth infra note 25. 
 5.  This Article’s approach is similar to that taken in Michael J. Meurer, Patent 
Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675 (2009). Meurer, however, considers 
only mistakes made during the PTO’s evaluation of patent applications. Id. This Article 
also includes mistakes made during litigation and thus adds a critical dimension to the 
analysis: the timing of the mistake. In a related vein, Mark Lemley has argued that the 
costs of an average early false positive are likely to be low, and thus it is not worthwhile to 
spend additional resources reducing the rate of early mistakes. See Lemley, supra note 3. I 
depart from that analysis by assessing variations in costs along the three characteristics of 
type, timing, and doctrinal basis. 
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false positives.6 But for other doctrines—like subject matter and non-
obviousness—late false positives may impose significant additional 
costs. The patent system should therefore approach these doctrines 
differently, being more cautious of late false positives on subject mat-
ter and nonobviousness and less worried about late false positives on 
enablement and definiteness. 
 False negatives present somewhat different considerations. The 
third general conclusion is that, unlike for false positives, the doctri-
nal basis of a false negative mistake will only indirectly affect the 
cost of the mistake, if it all. The cost of a false negative mistake flows 
from the disincentive effect it will have on future innovators who 
worry that they too will be wrongly denied patent rights. This disin-
centive effect is not necessarily doctrine-specific; there is nothing in 
the doctrines themselves that dictates, for example, that the disin-
centive effect from wrongly denying a patent for failure to comply 
with the enablement requirement is larger than the disincentive ef-
fect from wrongly denying a patent for failure to comply with the 
novelty requirement. As a result, the doctrinal basis of the false neg-
ative may only indirectly affect the costs of the mistake.  
 It is possible that particular patentability rules tend to misfire on 
patents with importantly different characteristics. One possibility is 
that the doctrines vary in the rate at which they produce false nega-
tives on patents covering inventions of different values. If so, then 
false negatives on doctrines that err on patents covering high-value 
inventions will be costlier than false negatives on doctrines that err 
on patents covering low-value inventions. Even if there is no varia-
tion on this dimension, the doctrines might differ on other grounds. 
Most plausibly, the doctrines will vary in the rate at which they pro-
duce false negatives in different industries; to the extent that they 
do, false negatives will have industry-specific effects by doctrine.  
 Finally, the comparison between early and late false negatives 
depends on the relative importance of three factors: (1) the efficacy of 
a short period of exclusivity; (2) the efficacy of non-patent appropria-
tion mechanisms (and their sensitivity to the timing of their adop-
tion); and (3) the visibility of false negatives. Late false negatives af-
ford the inventor at least a short period of exclusivity (from patent 
grant to invalidation) in which to appropriate some of the value of 
her investment; when that period is lucrative, late false negatives 
will be less costly to the inventor than early ones. But the two other 
factors will favor early false negatives. Inventors will turn to non-
patent appropriation mechanisms to solve the public good problem 
created by false negatives. These mechanisms include trade secrecy, 
                                                 
 6.  Late false positives are of course undesirable for all the reasons we wish the 
patentability rules to be properly enforced as a general matter. 
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tacit knowledge, trademarks, and contracts. To varying degrees, the-
se mechanisms are more easily implemented early in the product de-
velopment lifecycle than later. So early false negatives—those made 
during the patent system’s evaluation of the application—should 
generally be easier for inventors to overcome than late false nega-
tives—those made during the patent system’s evaluation of an issued 
patent during infringement litigation. Moreover, because it will be 
easier for third parties to learn of late false negatives than early 
ones, late mistakes may have larger negative effects on incentives to 
innovate than early ones.  
 This is a highly uncertain and complex area of the law. The story 
here cannot be conclusive; these are ultimately empirical questions 
that can only be settled with empirical data. But given the well-
known difficulties in obtaining good empirical data on the effects of 
the patent system,7 it is better to proceed on the basis of well-
developed intuitions. The intuitions developed here can provide new 
ways of thinking about patent doctrines, inform patent policy, and 
guide future empirical research. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on 
the goals of patent law and describes how the patentability rules fur-
ther those goals. It then introduces a framework for assessing the 
costs of patent mistakes. Part II uses that framework to reach four 
general conclusions about the costs of mistakes of different types, 
made at different times, and made with respect to different patenta-
bility rules. Part III draws out the implications of this analysis. Part  
IV concludes. 
 
                                                 
 7.  See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 618 (2009) (noting in the context of debates about the scope of 
patentable subject matter that “the ultimate policy judgment—the extent to which the 
potentially positive effects of patents are outweighed by their potential negative effects—
has long been recognized as unknown given the current state of human knowledge”). In 
Fritz Machlup’s 1958 formulation:   
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to 
recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for 
a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. 
FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. 
Print 1958). Though we’ve made progress in the last fifty years, there is still a great deal of 
uncertainty. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select 
Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 386 (2009) (“[I]t is probably uncontroversial among 
most economically informed observers that Machlup’s qualified statement still 
characterizes our current understanding of the net social value of the intellectual property 
system as a general matter.”). 
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II.   PATENT THEORY, PATENT DOCTRINE, AND PATENT MISTAKES 
 This Part provides the building blocks for analyzing patent mis-
takes, which I define as the mistakes that the patent system makes 
when it applies the doctrines governing patentability to particular 
inventions.8 These doctrines, which I call the patentability rules, are 
designed to determine whether granting a patent would further the 
patent system’s goals. I therefore begin by exploring those goals in 
Section A. I then describe the patentability rules and their relation-
ships to the patent system’s goals in Section B. With that foundation 
in place, Section C identifies the three primary characteristics that 
affect the costs of patent mistakes. 
 Patent commentators debate many aspects of what patent law 
should do and how patent law does whatever it is that it should do. 
In order to simplify the exposition, I discuss only the areas of broad-
est agreement. The details might change depending on how we re-
solve disputed questions of patent theory. The overall picture, how-
ever, will be similar regardless of how those debates play out. I take 
here as given that patent law is primarily designed to provide incen-
tives to innovate and secondarily designed to encourage disclosure of 
technical and legal information.9 Though those points might be dis-
                                                 
 8.  My focus here is on what may be termed retail mistakes; that is, those that occur 
on a case-by-case basis. I set aside wholesale mistakes that occur for groups of patents as a 
whole. An example of a wholesale mistake would be an interpretation of the subject matter 
requirement that wrongly excluded an entire technological field, although note that the 
subject matter doctrine can also be applied in a retail manner. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 3225-29 (2010) (rejecting “two proposed categorical limitations” for deciding 
whether an invention covers patentable subject matter and urging courts to take a case-by-
case approach instead). Wholesale mistakes may raise different concerns than the retail 
mistakes I evaluate here. Cf. Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1275, 1314-33 (2010) (developing a distinction between retail sorting, in which the 
government decides on a case-by-case basis, and wholesale sorting, in which the 
government decides for a large group of cases). Of course, the patent system surely also 
makes mistakes in deciding, for example, questions of infringement. These are outside the 
scope of this Article. 
 9.  This, at least, is the standard account. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) (“The 
standard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of 
research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technological 
progress.”); Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2008) (“[T]he dominant justification for the patent system has 
shifted toward an economic rationale based upon incentives.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (“There is virtually 
unanimous agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to promote innovation by 
granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (describing patent law as “rewarding inventors for taking 
two steps . . . : to invent in the first instance and to reveal information to the public about 
these inventions”); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (“The standard justification . . . is that patents are necessary to solve 
an appropriability problem . . . stem[ming] from the ‘public good’ characteristics of 
intellectual goods.”). Here are the traditional citations to the Constitution’s Intellectual 
Property Clause and to the Supreme Court’s description of the “economic philosophy” 
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puted, they are the foundation for a general consensus about patent 
law. To the extent that we reach other conclusions, the discussion 
here would have to be modified accordingly. 
A.   The Goals of Patent Law 
 Patent law aims to provide optimal incentives to innovate.10 With-
out patents, inventors deciding whether to develop an invention face 
an appropriability problem. Research produces valuable information 
that has public good characteristics—it is both non-excludable (that 
is, the inventor cannot easily prevent strangers from using it) and 
non-rival (that is, one person’s use of the information does not limit 
another person’s use of it).11 Once the inventor completes her re-
search, her rivals will be able to copy the invention and sell it at 
much lower prices because they have not incurred the inventor’s cost 
of development. The inventor will therefore find it difficult to profit 
from her research projects.  
 The patent system tries to solve this appropriability problem by 
granting inventors a right to exclude others from their inventions.12 
That right to exclude encourages inventors to conduct costly research 
by promising the ability to charge supracompetitive prices for their 
inventions. To the extent that patents in fact confer monopolies, 
though, we will incur their social costs. The patent system’s solution 
thus pays the costs of monopolies to gain the benefits of increased 
incentives to invent. 
 If it were costless to do so, the patent system could evaluate each 
patent application to directly determine whether the trade-off was 
worth it from a social welfare perspective.13 We could ask something 
like, “All things considered, will society be better off if we grant this 
patent or deny it?” But that evaluation would be prohibitively costly. 
The patent system instead uses a set of rules that aim—at some  
                                                                                                                  
underlying it. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
There are, of course, other views about what the patent system does or should do, but I set 
them aside and focus on the standard rationale here. For some sample alternative 
accounts, see LANDES & POSNER, supra, at 326-32 (arguing that patent law serves in large 
part to channel innovators away from trade secret law so that information about 
inventions reaches the public domain more quickly); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002) (arguing that firms use patents as signals of their knowledge 
capital); and Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra (arguing that patents are used to form 
portfolios that function primarily through scale and diversity effects even though 
individual patents might have negative expected value). 
 10.  See supra note 9. 
 11.  Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
 12.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1580 (noting the standard view that “exclusive 
rights address the public goods nature of inventions that are expensive to produce but easy 
to appropriate”). 
 13.  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 281-82 (1977). 
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reasonable cost—to sort applications that should be granted from 
those that should be denied, given the background goals of patent 
law. This sorting is the “central problem” of the patent system.14  
The next Section describes the patentability rules used to solve that  
sorting problem. 
B.   Patentability Rules 
 There are many plausible interpretations of what, precisely, the 
patentability rules should do and whether they achieve their intend-
ed purposes in a reasonable manner. Again, I set aside these debates 
about the means and ends of the patentability rules and stick instead 
to the standard accounts.15 Though the particulars are open to ques-
tion, the general outlines here are less controversial. 
 The patentability rules can be placed into four categories. First, 
there are rules regarding scope: the subject matter and utility doc-
trines.16 The point of these rules is to withhold patents when inven-
tors seek them so early in the innovation process that they would 
permit control over too broad a range of follow-on innovation. Thus, 
the subject matter doctrine permits patents on “anything under the 
sun that is made by man,” but it gets its teeth by excluding “laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”17 Patents on the 
latter would grant excessive control over downstream inventions.18 
Because some inventions that pass the subject matter test may still 
excessively inhibit subsequent research, the utility doctrine denies 
patents on inventions for which the only known use is as a subject of  
scientific inquiry.19 
 Second, there are rules regarding the invention itself: novelty and 
nonobviousness.20 These invention rules are designed to avoid issuing 
                                                 
 14.  Id. at 280. 
 15.  For an example of debates about the means and ends of the patentability rules, 
compare Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written 
Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 55, 62-69 (2000) (arguing “that no compelling reason to recognize a distinct written 
description requirement exists”), with Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written 
Description Requirement, 119 YALE. L.J. ONLINE 127 (2010) (arguing that a distinct written 
description requirement ensures that the patent’s scope is calibrated to match the 
inventor’s achievement). 
 16.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 17.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); accord Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
 18.  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853) (rejecting a claim as covering 
unpatentable subject matter because it would allow the inventor to “shut[] the door against 
inventions of other persons”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1643. 
 19.  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966); Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 
1644-46 (explaining that the Brenner rule is driven by concerns that “giving patent 
protection too early—before the actual use of the product has been identified— . . . might 
deter research by others on the use of the product”). 
 20.  35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006). 
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patents on things that we do not need the patent system in order to 
get. Novelty requires that the patent claim something that is not al-
ready known.21 Without something like the novelty requirement, so-
ciety would pay the price of patents without any corresponding bene-
fits in return—after all, the public already knew about the claimed 
invention, so there is no longer any need to provide an incentive for 
someone to invent it.22 Nonobviousness goes one step further: it holds 
that even if the public did not already know about the precise inven-
tion claimed in the patent, it is still ineligible for patent protection if 
it would have been obvious to a person in the field.23 The idea here is 
that inventors will make obvious improvements to existing technolo-
gy because these improvements are available “off the shelf” and re-
quire no supracompetitive returns as an inducement for inventors to 
attain them. Even if rivals can copy the invention, it is so easy (and 
therefore cheap) for the inventor to reach it that the public good prob-
lem would not pose a serious obstacle to this kind of progress.24 
 Third, there are rules regarding disclosure: the enablement and 
best mode doctrines.25 The point of the disclosure rules is to force the 
                                                 
 21.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102; Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 
DUKE L.J. 919, 922 (2011). Until the recent passage of the America Invents Act, the 
American novelty rule had some nuances arising from the fact that we had a first-to-
invent, rather than a first-to-file, system. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (amending novelty rules to establish a first-to-file 
system of priority); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (novelty rules that prevailed prior to passage of 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act). Although the old novelty rule will continue to apply to 
some patents during the transition period accompanying the passage of the America 
Invents Act, see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(n) (setting effective date 18 months 
after enactment), I set aside its nuances because they are irrelevant to understanding the 
purpose of the novelty doctrine at the level of generality that I discuss it.  
 22.  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent 
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2000). This notion that the patentee must provide 
something “new” in order to obtain the right to exclude has been long recognized. See, e.g., 
1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 221 (Little, 
Brown, and Co. 1890). 
 23.  35 U.S.C. § 103; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); Graham v. 
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966). 
 24.  Merges, supra note 1, at 592 n.41. 
 25.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). I have left out the written description requirement. Insofar 
as this rule requires anything other than what is already part of the enablement, best 
mode, and definiteness rules, it is to make it cheaper for the patent system to evaluate 
whether the invention has met the other patentability requirements. As the Federal 
Circuit recently put it when it held that section 112 includes a written description 
requirement distinct from enablement: “[a] description of the claimed invention allows the 
[PTO] to examine applications effectively; courts to understand the invention, determine 
compliance with the statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and 
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive 
rights.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). Note that the last two goals are the same as those served by the enablement 
(“understand and improve upon the invention”) and definiteness (“avoid the claimed 
boundaries”) rules. Id. In short, the written description’s only unique purpose is to reduce 
administrative costs. Mistakes regarding compliance with the written description 
requirement may thus affect the cost of assessing compliance with other patentability rules 
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inventor to reveal important technical information regarding the in-
vention. Enablement requires that the patent’s specification teach 
someone knowledgeable in the field how to “make and use” the inven-
tion.26 The best mode requirement demands that the inventor reveal 
her preferred way of making and using it.27 These doctrines lighten 
the informational burden borne by those who seek to build on the  
inventor’s contribution.28 
 Finally, there is the definiteness doctrine, which requires that the 
inventor describe the invention in clear and precise terms.29 This rule 
is intended to provide notice as to the legal bounds of the inventor’s 
rights to exclude.30 That notice makes it easier for third parties to avoid 
infringement and for the inventor herself to sell or transfer her rights. 
C.   Mapping the Terrain of Patent Mistakes 
 The patentability rules are shortcuts. If we had unlimited re-
sources and perfect information, it would be possible simply to de-
termine whether granting a given patent would, on net, promote the 
goals of patent law. Put differently, an omniscient actor would have 
no use for the patentability rules because patent law’s goals provide 
sufficient grounds for deciding whether to grant a patent. The actor 
would grant only those patents that pass a cost-benefit analysis in-
corporating whatever criteria are made relevant by the goals of pa-
tent law. When we ask, for example, whether an invention is novel 
and non-obvious, we are in effect asking something like whether the 
invention is the kind of thing for which the prospect of a patent pro-
vides incentives that justify the deadweight losses of the patent 
grant. With unlimited resources and perfect information, an omnisci-
ent actor could answer that latter question directly, rather than rely 
on the indirect answer to it provided by the analysis of whether the 
invention is novel and non-obvious.31 Simply stated, the patentability 
                                                                                                                  
and may therefore affect the rate of errors. But it will not affect the costs of the errors that 
we do make. Because this Article’s focus is on the costs of errors, rather than their rate, I 
do not discuss written description separately from the other disclosure rules. 
 26.  35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 27.  Id.; Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 963 (requiring both a subjective inquiry into the 
inventor’s own view of the best mode of practicing the invention and an objective inquiry 
into the sufficiency of the disclosure of the best mode found in the specification). 
 28.  See Matthew H. Solomson, Patently Confusing: The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent 
Treatment of Claim Scope as a Limit on the Best Mode Disclosure Requirement, 45 IDEA 
383, 385 (2005) (noting that best mode requirement is designed to place inventor and rivals 
on equal footing). 
 29.  35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 30.  All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that 
the claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of the 
legal protection afforded by the patent.”). 
 31.  As a result, it is plausible to conceptualize even perfect applications of the 
patentability rules as mistakes—sometimes an invention that is novel and non-obvious will 
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rules are surely overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to 
their underlying purposes. 
 An omniscient actor would therefore have no use for the patenta-
bility rules. Nonetheless, for the sake of conceptual clarity, I will as-
sume that the patentability rules were designed to be applied by an 
omniscient actor, who could always determine whether a given in-
vention was useful, novel, and so on. Whether because of institution-
al design,32 cognitive constraints,33 or imperfect information,34 the pa-
tent system will sometimes reach conclusions that differ from the 
ones that the omniscient actor would reach. Mistakes thus occur not 
because the rules themselves align imperfectly with their underlying 
purposes, but rather because we cannot know to a certainty whether 
a given invention complies with the requirements of the rules. For 
purposes of this Article, then, a mistake occurs whenever the patent 
system’s application of the patentability rules reaches a decision 
(grant or deny) at odds with the decision that an omniscient actor 
applying the rules would reach. 
 Mistakes, so defined, will inevitably occur when the patent system 
applies the patentability rules in specific cases.35 Even as defined 
here, though, mistakes are not necessarily undesirable. It costs some-
thing to avoid a mistake, and our resources are limited. Whenever 
the costs of avoiding the mistake are greater than the costs of making 
it, we will be better off making the mistake. In short, the optimal lev-
el of mistakes is greater than zero.36 
 In order to make optimal mistakes, we need to know both the 
costs of the mistake and the costs of mistake-avoidance. A complete 
theory of optimal mistakes is beyond the scope of this Article. I set 
                                                                                                                  
nonetheless be a net loss in light of the patent system’s goals. An example here might be an 
accidental invention that was achieved without the patent system’s incentives; think of the 
use of penicillin to treat infections. The deadweight losses incurred by granting a patent on 
that kind of invention may outweigh the benefits of, for example, faster distribution  
of knowledge.  
 32.  Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
687, ¶¶ 16-24 (2010) (describing incentives that lead patent examiners to issue patents 
that do not meet the patentability requirements and citing the PTO’s self-described 
mission as “to help our customers get patents”); Merges, supra note 1, at 609 (“The current 
bonus system [for PTO examiners] is believed to skew incentives in favor of granting patents.”). 
 33.  See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) 
(reporting results of experimental study indicating that hindsight bias causes systematic 
errors in the application of patent doctrine); see also Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-
Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. 
Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006) (discussing a follow-up experiment). 
 34.  Thomas, supra note 1, at 313 (describing broad scope of prior art that may be 
relevant to a patent’s validity under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)). 
 35.  See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 61 (contending that resource and 
information constraints make mistakes inevitable); Meurer, supra note 5, at 679 (“It is vital 
to recognize that examiners will make mistakes given the time constraints that they face.”). 
 36.  See generally Lemley, supra note 3.  
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aside entirely the costs of mistake-avoidance. And I do not intend to 
provide a precise accounting of the costs of a given mistake. The goal 
for now is to take an important step in the direction of optimal mis-
takes by explaining how the relative costs of patent mistakes vary by 
three important characteristics. The first is the type of mistake—
false positive or false negative. The second is the timing of the mis-
take—whether it is made early during the application process or late 
during the infringement litigation process. The last is the doctrinal 
basis for the mistake—which of the patentability rules has the patent 
system wrongly applied. This Section describes these characteristics  
in detail. 
 1.   Type 
 The patent system’s mistakes will be one of two familiar types: 
false positive or false negative. A false positive mistake occurs when 
the patent system grants a patent on an application that does not 
comply with the patentability rules. Suppose someone applies today 
for a patent that claims a device with “two wheels, the one directly in 
front of the other, combined with a mechanism for driving the 
wheels, and an arrangement for guiding; which arrangement also 
enables the rider to balance himself upon the two wheels.”37 A bicy-
cle. Because that exact invention was disclosed long ago, such an ap-
plication would fall short of the novelty requirement.38 If the patent 
system nonetheless grants a patent on this application, the mistake 
will be a false positive. 
 A false negative mistake occurs when an application is not grant-
ed even though it complies with the patentability rules. Suppose 
someone applies today for a patent on a new treatment that prevents 
memory loss in patients with Alzheimer’s disease. Assume that the 
application complied with all the patentability rules, but the patent 
system wrongly concludes that the application does not tell a person 
skilled in the treatment of Alzheimer’s how to make and use the in-
vention—that is, the patent system wrongly concludes that the pa-
tent does not comply with the enablement requirement.39 If no patent 
issues from this application, the mistake will be a false negative. 
 2.   Timing 
 We have so far considered the government’s evaluation of patenta-
bility at a high level of abstraction. Let’s add some procedural details. 
                                                 
 37.  U.S. Patent No. 59,915 (filed April 1866). 
 38.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
 39.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
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The government may evaluate patentability twice.40 I call the first 
evaluation “early” and the second one “late.” The terms early and late 
are relative. I use them here to refer to when in the life of the patent 
the evaluations occur. 
 Begin with the early evaluation. Suppose an inventor finds a way 
to make a paper cup that can insulate beverages much better than 
existing paper cups. It can be used equally well for drinking freshly-
brewed coffee or ice-cold beer. She decides to obtain a patent on her 
insulating paper cup.  
 In order to do so, she must first submit an application to the Pa-
tent and Trademark Office (PTO),41 which assigns it to an examiner.42 
If the examiner decides that the application complies with all of the 
patentability rules, he issues a patent.43 If not, he must tell the in-
ventor why he thinks the application is deficient,44 and the inventor 
has the opportunity to respond.45 This process may be repeated until 
(1) the examiner grants a patent on the application; (2) the applicant 
                                                 
 40.  I am setting aside intermediate examinations that occur when administrative 
proceedings are invoked after the patent has issued. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2006) 
(establishing ex parte procedures for evaluating the patentability of issued patents); 35 
U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2006) (establishing inter partes procedures for evaluating the 
patentability of issued patents) (amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 299 (2011) (prohibiting the institution of inter partes 
reexaminations until after a post-grant opposition window closes, increasing the threshold 
for instituting inter partes reexaminations, and providing that such reexaminations will be 
conducted by three-judge panels of the PTO)); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6(d) 
(creating a post-grant review proceeding that can be instituted in the first nine-months 
after the patent issues). I set these proceedings aside because they might occur at any 
point in time—shortly after issuance or just before (or even during or after) litigation. So 
there is little to be said generally about the timing of administrative patentability review. 
To the extent that the review occurs close in time to the PTO’s initial decision to issue a 
patent, the review might be said to be early and the analysis of early mistakes applies. 
(Note that this will be true of all proceedings under Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
§ 6(d).) To the extent that the review occurs long after the PTO issues the patent, the 
review might be said to be late and the analysis of late mistakes applies. 
 41.  35 U.S.C. §§ 111-113 (2006). 
 42.  4-11 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.01 (2011). 
 43.  35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006). 
 44.  35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006) (requiring that the examiner “stat[e] the reasons for [a] 
rejection”). The examiner’s rejections should be complete to the extent possible; that is, 
they must identify the fundamental defects in the application, although there is some 
leeway for alternative denials on novelty and nonobviousness grounds, as well as for 
instances in which the indefiniteness of the claims prevents the examiner from comparing 
them to the prior art. 4-11 CHISUM, supra note 42, § 11.03(1)(c)(i). 
 45.  The inventor can demand that the examiner conduct at least one reexamination of 
the application. 35 U.S.C. § 132. The inventor’s response might explain why she disagrees 
with the examiner (including submitting evidence and affidavits to demonstrate 
patentability), amend or cancel problematic claims, or modify the specification. 4-11 
CHISUM, supra note 42, § 11.03(2)(a)(i). The response cannot, however, introduce “new 
matter” into the application. 35 U.S.C. § 132. In order to introduce new matter, the 
applicant must submit what is known as a continuation-in-part to the application, which 
applies a later filing date to the newly-added material. 4A-13 CHISUM, supra note 42, 
§ 13.03(3). 
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abandons the application; or (3) the applicant appeals the examiner’s 
rejection and a final decision issues from the courts.46 The early deci-
sion is made whenever any of these three events occur—grant, aban-
donment, or a judicial decision on the application’s patentability. If 
the outcome here deviates from what would have occurred if an om-
niscient actor had evaluated the application’s compliance with the 
patentability rules, there has been an early mistake. 
 Now turn to the late evaluation. Suppose the PTO had granted the 
inventor a patent on her insulating paper cup. Some months or years 
later, a rival begins making and selling paper cups incorporating the 
patented technology.47 The patentee may sue her rival for infringe-
ment.48 In such a lawsuit, the rival may defend himself on the ground 
that the patent is invalid.49 If he does so, the patent system—here the 
court or jury—must again evaluate whether the patent complies with 
the patentability rules. If it concludes that the patent does not com-
ply with the patentability rules, the patent is invalidated.50 If it con-
cludes that the patent does comply with the patentability rules, the 
challenge is rejected. If the outcome here deviates from what would 
have occurred with an omniscient actor, there has been a late mistake. 
 Note that a late decision could only occur if the patent system had 
issued a patent at the early stage, so any late false positive must 
therefore have been preceded by an early false positive. If, at the ear-
                                                 
 46.  Technically, the applicant would first have to seek review within the PTO. See 35 
U.S.C. § 134(a) (2006) (permitting appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
(“BPAI”) by “[a]n applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected”); 35 
U.S.C. § 141 (2006) (permitting appeal to the Federal Circuit from decisions of the BPAI); 
35 U.S.C. § 145 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith American Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, § 9(a), 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011) (creating cause of action in district court to seek 
issuance of patent after BPAI rejection). 
 47.  Since Congress established the Federal Circuit, the average litigated patent is six 
years old from the date of issuance to the date that litigation begins and nine years from 
issuance to the date of decision. Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The 
Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal 
Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 431 (2009). 
 48.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(b) (2006) (allowing the patentee to sue for infringement anyone 
who “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” the invention). Only a small 
percentage of issued patents in fact reach litigation. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 1501 
(over 98% of patents are never litigated). Late evaluations by the patent system are the 
exception, not the rule; for most patents, the patent system typically only conducts an early 
evaluation. But more valuable patents are more likely to be litigated and, therefore, to 
receive a second, late evaluation. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore 
& R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439-43 (2004) (explaining why 
“litigated patents tend to be much more valuable than others on average” and why 
“valuable patents are much more likely than others to be litigated”). 
 49.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (2011). 
 50.  That evaluation accords significant weight to the early decision to grant the 
patent. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (holding that a party 
who asserts that a patent is invalid must present clear and convincing evidence of 
invalidity). But set this nuance aside for the moment. The important point is that the 
government again evaluates whether the inventor has complied with the  
patentability requirements.   
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ly stage, the patent system denied the application (rightly or wrong-
ly), there will be no late decision—there cannot be infringement liti-
gation if no patent has issued. And if, at the early stage, the patent 
system correctly granted the application, then a late decision affirm-
ing the patent’s validity will be a true positive, by definition. Only if 
the early decision was an incorrect grant of an application—that is, 
an early false positive—might the patent system commit a late false 
positive at all. 
 Patent mistakes may therefore be made early or late. An early 
evaluation occurs at the patent’s birth. Ordinarily, a late evaluation 
occurs when the patent is well into adulthood.51 Though I use the 
terms early and late to link the patent system’s decisions (and its 
mistakes) to the lifespan of the patent, those decisions might also 
correlate with important events outside the life of the patent, like 
product launches. These correlations will vary across industries. In 
the pharmaceutical industry, for example, an early evaluation will 
occur before the firm launches a drug incorporating the patented in-
vention, and a late evaluation will occur after the drug is on the mar-
ket. In the software industry, on the other hand, both early and late 
evaluations often occur after product launch. The industry-specific 
correlation of timing within the patent system to timing outside the 
patent system will affect, on an industry-specific basis, the relative 
assessment of mistakes made at different times.  
 3.   Doctrine 
 As the above examples suggest, mistakes can be made on any of 
the doctrinal bases. The bicycle patent was wrongly issued despite its 
failure to comply with the novelty requirement. The Alzheimer’s pa-
tent was wrongly denied for failure to comply with the enablement 
requirement. And, of course, we could imagine mistakes on any of the  
patentability rules.  
 The application of the patentability rules—at the early and late 
stages—is all-or-nothing.52 If the patent system concludes at the ear-
ly stage that any one of the rules is violated, it will not grant a patent 
on the application. And if the patent system concludes at the late 
stage that any one of the rules is violated, it will invalidate the pa-
tent. Only when the patent system concludes that all of the patenta-
bility rules are satisfied will it grant a patent (at the early stage) or 
uphold the validity of an issued patent (at the late stage). 
                                                 
 51.  See Atkinson et al., supra note 47, at 431. 
 52.  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 
(2002) (listing the “statutory requirements [that] must be satisfied before a patent can 
issue” and noting that the “failure to meet these requirements could lead to the [wrongly] 
issued patent being held invalid in later litigation”).  
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III.   HOW TO MAKE BETTER MISTAKES 
 The last Part identified the key characteristics of the mistakes 
that the patent system might produce. I have assumed (and will con-
tinue to assume) that if the patent system could apply the rules 
without cost and without ever making a mistake, the patentability 
rules would produce a first-best world. But we are in a second-best 
world in which the patent system will make mistakes, for any num-
ber of reasons.53 
 This Part will try to make progress by providing a sense of the 
relative costs of patent mistakes. Each mistake produces some nega-
tive consequences—some mistakes might undermine incentives to 
innovate, others might make it too hard for the public to access in-
formation, and others might generate too much legal ambiguity. The-
se potential deviations from ideal outcomes, however, are not the end 
of the story. Instead, private parties will respond to patent mis-
takes.54 The degree to which they can do so will depend on each mis-
take’s type, timing, and doctrinal basis. The aim here is to identify 
the most likely scenarios regarding how the costs of mistakes vary 
and to make explicit the assumptions that would lead us to favor  
alternative views. 
A.   False Positives 
 We begin with false positive mistakes. This Section argues that 
because each doctrine is designed to prevent a particular kind of 
problem, and the kind of problem posed by a wrongly-issued patent 
thus turns on which doctrine it violated, the costs of false positives 
will vary by doctrine. Furthermore, timing has doctrine-specific ef-
fects on the costs of false positives. Because any late false positive 
must have been preceded by an early false positive, the relevant 
question is whether the late false positive imposes costs in addition 
to what we have already incurred as a result of the early false posi-
tive. For the definiteness and disclosure rules, the surprising answer 
is no—the problems posed by early false positives on these rules ei-
ther (1) will be resolved by the late mistake (in the case of definite-
ness); or (2) will be much less serious by the time we get to the late 
decision (in the case of disclosure). For the scope and invention rules, 
however, the answer is yes—the problems posed by early false posi-
tives on these rules will likely persist after late false positives. It is 
therefore less important to avoid late false positives on definiteness 
and disclosure than for scope and invention. And, if we want to avoid 
                                                 
 53.  See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
 54.  Indeed, “[o]ur patent system envisions a mixture of public and private 
expenditures to determine the validity of patents.” Merges, supra note 1, at 596. 
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the costs of false positives on definiteness and disclosure, we will 
have to do so early. 
 1.   Doctrine as a Direct Selection Mechanism 
 As previously noted, the patentability rules can be (roughly) sort-
ed into four categories, based on the goals served by each set of rules. 
The scope rules limit the inventor’s ability to control downstream in-
novation.55 The invention rules reject patents on inventions that soci-
ety has either already obtained or will likely obtain in short order.56 
The disclosure rules make it easier for third parties to improve on or 
design cheap substitutes for the invention.57 And the definiteness 
rules help the inventor, her rivals, and third parties organize their 
affairs without inadvertently exposing themselves to legal liability.58 
 These goals might reasonably be contested. We might also debate 
whether the patentability rules as currently designed are the most 
effective means for achieving the goals. Maybe we cannot be certain 
what, exactly, the novelty doctrine does and whether it does so as 
well as it could.59 And maybe there is some overlap in the doctrines—
novelty and nonobviousness seem to pursue related ends, as do ena-
blement and best mode.60 But we can at least be confident that, 
whatever it is that the novelty rule does, it is something different 
than what the enablement rule does. And the general categories into 
which I have placed the patentability rules seem plausibly correct. In 
any event, the relevance of doctrine for false positives does not de-
pend on these precise goals being right or this precise categorization 
of the doctrines being accurate. Instead, there is only one condition 
that must be true: The patentability rules must not all do exactly the 
same thing.61 That much, at least, seems right. 
                                                 
 55.  See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
 56.  See supra text accompanying notes 20-24. 
 57.  See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
 58.  See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. 
 59.  I have suggested that novelty prevents the issuance of patents that remove 
information from the public domain, rather than add to it. See supra text accompanying 
note 22. Some aspects of the novelty requirement—for example, those relating to whether 
references that are difficult to find qualify as prior art—suggest that the rule is designed to 
promote efficient choices between independent research and searches of existing 
knowledge. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 419-23 (3d ed. 2002). 
 60.  For example, it’s no stretch to think that novelty does something like what 
nonobviousness does, but that applying the novelty rule first lowers the rate of errors on 
the nonobviousness rule. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 59, at 372-73. This view would 
emphasize that novelty requires a precise identification of the differences between the 
alleged invention and the prior art, while nonobviousness requires an assessment of the 
magnitude of those differences. Id. That latter, more complex assessment will likely be 
more accurate if conducted separately from the former. Id. 
 61.  The categories and theoretical explanations I use can be easily replaced with any 
alternative explanations and the same conclusions will hold. Of course, there would have to 
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 The doctrinal basis of a false positive affects its costs by selecting 
for patents that pose different problems. Each patentability rule is 
designed to prevent or mitigate a problem that would arise if the rule 
were not enforced. When the patent system mistakenly does not en-
force any one of the patentability rules, we bear the costs of the prob-
lems that rule is designed to mitigate. This is a necessary conse-
quence of differentiated patentability rules. 
 As an example of how this works, suppose that the patent system 
commits false positive mistakes on two separate patent applica-
tions.62 The first application complies with all of the patentability 
rules except for definiteness. The patent system nonetheless issues a 
patent because it fails to recognize that the application violates that 
rule; it thus commits a false positive on definiteness. The second ap-
plication complies with all of the patentability rules except for ena-
blement. The patent system, however, fails to recognize that the ap-
plication violates that rule; it thus commits a false positive on ena-
blement and wrongly issues a patent on the second application.  
 The patent system committed a false positive on each application, 
and we have two patents that we’d be better off not having. But alt-
hough we’d be better off without either of these two patents, they dif-
fer in important respects, and those differences are a necessary con-
sequence of the doctrinal bases for the mistakes. Because the patent 
system committed a false positive on definiteness for the first patent, 
we know that it does not clearly define the scope of the patentee’s 
rights.63 The second patent does. And because the patent system 
committed a false positive on enablement for the second patent, we 
know that it does not tell someone working in the field how to make 
and use the invention it covers.64 The first patent does. These patents 
thus pose distinct problems.  
 It is difficult to assess whether false positives on enablement are 
costlier than, for example, false positives on definiteness. We should, 
however, expect the costs to differ by doctrine. Given the differences 
in the types of problems caused by false positives on different doc-
trines, the costs should differ too. This doctrine-by-doctrine variation 
                                                                                                                  
be tweaks to account for how alternate categorizations or explanations depart from the 
standard view I adopt here. So if we think that novelty is primarily about efficient search, 
rather than avoiding patents that remove information from the public domain, then false 
positives on novelty will encourage waste of resources developing inventions that could be 
more cheaply obtained by reviewing existing literature. This is a different kind of problem 
than the ones I set out in the text, and it will impose its own costs. But the main argument 
is simply that the costs of false positives will vary by doctrine, and this is true whether 
novelty is about promoting efficient search or avoiding patent thickets. 
 62.  I assume here for simplicity’s sake that the patent system makes only one mistake 
per patent. The analysis can be easily extended to multiple mistakes. See, e.g., infra notes 
104-05. 
 63.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 64.  See id. 
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in the costs of false positives is a necessary feature of any patent sys-
tem that includes differentiated patentability rules, as ours does.  
 2.   Timing Effects 
 The effects of timing on the costs of false positives depend on their 
doctrinal bases. This subsection thus assesses the effect of timing on 
the costs of false positives by doctrinal category. Because late false 
positives are necessarily preceded by early false positives,65 we will 
want to know the additional costs imposed by a late false positive so 
that we can think about whether it’s worth risking a late false nega-
tive in order to avoid a late false positive. If a late false positive on 
some doctrine is roughly indistinguishable from a late true negative, 
it’s unlikely that it will be worth the resources spent getting it right 
or the risk of getting it wrong by wrongly invalidating a patent that 
should be upheld. This analysis can also tell us whether the early 
decision is our only chance to avoid the costs of the mistake. It would 
be a poor strategy to count on litigation to fix examination errors on 
doctrines for which we will incur most of the costs before litigation.  
 As we will see, for the scope and invention rules, a late false posi-
tive might impose significant additional costs. For the disclosure and 
definiteness rules, however, the additional costs incurred as a result 
of a late false positive will likely be low. We should therefore be 
more willing to tolerate late false positives on the latter rules than 
on the former. 
 (a)   Disclosure Rules 
 The disclosure rules—enablement and best mode—attempt to en-
sure that patents communicate information about the invention.66 
False positive mistakes on these rules permit inventors to obtain and 
enforce patents even when those patents do not convey important 
information to those who read them. The problem caused by these 
mistakes is that the inventor’s rivals will have to do more of their 
own research to copy the invention than the patentability rules 
deem optimal.67 Disclosure false positives force a wasteful duplica-
tion of resources by rivals trying to accomplish what the inventor 
has already done. 
                                                 
 65.  See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
 66.  35 U.S.C. § 112. Again, I set aside written description because its only 
independent purpose is to reduce the administrative costs involved in assessing whether 
the other patentability rules are met. See supra note 25. 
 67.  There is a long-standing debate in the patent literature regarding the extent to 
which duplication of research efforts—known as patent races—are good or bad. For 
introductions to this debate, see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races 
over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2007) and Tim Wu, Essay, Intellectual Property, 
Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123 (2006). 
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 There is an important difference between early and late false posi-
tives for these rules. Though the inventor found a solution to a tech-
nical problem, it may not be the only one. With the passage of time, 
other solutions may present themselves, and rivals will be able to 
build on the technical information revealed by them. To the extent 
that enablement and best mode try to put the inventor and her rivals 
on equal footing at the moment of patent issuance, that goal is more 
crucial when the invention is first patented than during infringement 
litigation when other advances may have already achieved the same 
effect. And assuming that the infringement allegations are not frivo-
lous, the fact of litigation indicates that the defendant has managed 
to duplicate the inventor’s achievement (or at least come close), be it 
by copying, reverse engineering, independent invention, or otherwise. 
In short, late false positives on disclosure occur after the costs of the 
mistake have been incurred. Because the harm from inadequate dis-
closure comes early in the patent’s life, late false positives contribute 
little to the overall costs of the mistake. If so, then we need not worry 
much about late disclosure false positives, at least as compared to  
early ones. 
 (b)   Definiteness 
 Definiteness is designed to ensure that the patent’s claims define 
the boundaries of the patentee’s legal rights to exclude others from 
the invention.68 When the patent system commits a false positive on 
definiteness, third parties will be unsure whether their activities ex-
pose them to potential infringement liability.69 And transactions in-
volving patents that do not comply with the definiteness doctrine will 
be more expensive as the licensee cannot be sure what, precisely, she  
is buying. 
 There is little that private parties can do to fix definiteness false 
positives. Perhaps they can pay more in legal fees to try to under-
stand the meaning of poorly-defined claim terms. Of course, to the 
extent that definiteness false positives make patent boundaries diffi-
cult to ascertain, they may also create something like a patent thick-
et—there may be many patents in a field with unclear boundaries, 
and those who wish to participate in the field will have trouble navi-
gating a path to liability-free activities.70 In those instances, cross-
licensing and patent pools might help.  
                                                 
 68.  3-8 CHISUM, supra note 42, § 8.03 (“The primary purpose of this requirement of 
definiteness in claims is to provide clear warning to others as to what constitutes 
infringement of the patent.”). 
 69.  See All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 70.  See notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
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 As with the disclosure rules, there is an important difference be-
tween definiteness false positive mistakes made early at the applica-
tion stage and those made late at the litigation stage. The definite-
ness rule holds only that claims that are “ ‘not amenable to construc-
tion’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous’ are indefinite.”71 When the patent sys-
tem commits an early false positive on definiteness, the issued patent 
simply stands with incomprehensible claims. But when the patent 
system commits a late false positive on definiteness, it does so in the 
context of litigation that includes a Markman hearing.72 In a  
Markman hearing, the court construes the claim and thus supplies 
some comprehensible meaning where previously none existed. As-
suming that false positives on definiteness will occur, the ones that 
occur during litigation are less troubling because they solve the prob-
lem that the definiteness doctrine tries to avoid. Perhaps some resid-
ual ambiguity remains, but late false positives provide a definite  
meaning to at least some previously incomprehensible part of the  
patent’s claims.  
 Late mistakes on definiteness therefore inform third parties of the 
scope of the patentee’s right to exclude. Put differently, late false pos-
itives at least reduce the uncertainty that makes definiteness false 
positives problematic in the first place. Because late false positives 
on definiteness impose little additional cost to that already incurred 
as a result of the early false positive, the patent system might there-
fore do well to focus its late resources on other doctrines. 
 (c)   Scope Rules 
 The scope rules include the subject matter and utility require-
ments. The former prohibits patents on laws of nature, abstract ide-
as, and natural phenomena.73 The latter requires a demonstration 
that the invention is good for something other than being the subject 
of scientific inquiry.74 False positives on these rules grant patentees 
excessive control over downstream innovation.75 The danger is that 
patents violating these rules will frequently lead to blocking-patent 
dynamics that can hinder technological progress.76 
 Blocking patents occur when one invention builds on a prior one; 
both inventions are patented, but the patent for the second invention 
                                                 
 71.  Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 72.  The hearings are named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 
370 (1996). That case held that the interpretation of patent claims is a legal question to be 
decided by the court, rather than a question for the jury. Id. at 391. 
 73.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 74.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 75.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 76.  Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1224 (“One 
normative reason to deny patentability to compositions of unknown use is to avoid 
inefficient blocking patents.”). 
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falls within the scope of the claims covered by the patent for the first 
invention.77 This situation might arise when, for example, one inven-
tor patents a chemical compound, and a second inventor discovers 
and patents a non-obvious use for that compound.78 The initial inven-
tor can freely produce the compound but cannot practice the newly-
discovered use without the second inventor’s permission.79 And be-
cause the second inventor cannot produce the compound without the 
first inventor’s permission, she cannot practice her newly-discovered 
use unless and until the first inventor allows her to do so.80 This situ-
ation may lead to a bargaining breakdown because it is difficult to 
allocate the value of each party’s contribution to the combination.81 In 
these circumstances, the parties may reach (or at least assert) widely 
divergent valuations for their relative contributions and therefore 
may be unable to come to an agreement on how to split the surplus 
from combining their patents.82 
 Utility false positives will frequently lead to these dynamics be-
cause they grant patents when there is no known use for the inven-
tion.83 Any productive use will be discovered later, either by the in-
ventor or a third party. Subject matter false positives—which permit 
inventors to obtain patents on abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natu-
ral phenomena—will similarly grant patents that confer on their 
holders exclusive rights over broad areas.84 Because second-comers 
will frequently encroach on those broad areas, these false positive 
mistakes will also tend to produce blocking patent scenarios. 
 Early false positives on the scope rules will be costly. Some inven-
tors may avoid an area if they fear getting caught in a blocking dy-
namic because of an early false positive, and bargaining breakdown 
may occur even if the patent is never asserted in infringement litiga-
tion. And late false positives likely impose significant costs in addi-
tion to those imposed by the early false positive. The solution to a 
blocking patent dynamic is bargaining, and there is little reason to 
think that bargaining will be easier if there has been a late false pos-
itive than if there has only been an early false positive. Perhaps the 
passage of time reveals better information about the value of each 
                                                 
 77.  Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case 
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80-81 (1994). 
 78.  Risch, supra note 76, at 1224. 
 79.  This is because patents confer only a right to exclude others, not an affirmative 
right to use. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 2012). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Merges, supra note 77, at 89 (“Where high uncertainty attends the valuation of 
assets to be exchanged, bargaining can be difficult.”). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966). See supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
 84.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309; accord Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218, 3225 (2010). See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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party’s contribution so that bargaining is easier later. But it is also 
plausible that the passage of time will merely prolong the bargaining 
stalemate. As a result, we cannot dismiss late false positives on these 
rules as unimportant; both early and late false positives here are costly. 
 (d)   Invention Rules 
 The invention rules include the novelty and nonobviousness re-
quirements.85 When the patent system commits false positives on 
these rules, it risks the creation of patent thickets—areas of technol-
ogy in which many parties can assert overlapping rights to any given 
invention.86 In a patent thicket, a license from a single patentee is use-
less because another rights-holder can veto the permission granted by 
the first licensor.87 This dynamic increases both the number of transac-
tions inventors must complete and the risk of bargaining breakdown.88 
 Although thickets increase the likelihood of bargaining break-
down, they do not make it inevitable. Instead, there are two potential 
solutions to patent thickets: cross-licensing agreements and patent 
pools. When two firms each hold patents that the other infringes, 
they can enter into a cross-licensing agreement—that is, they agree 
to grant licenses that permit each to use the other’s patents.89 They 
can also be extended to include more than two parties. Patent pools 
are similar to cross-licenses in that they also bundle patents together 
to cut through a patent thicket’s overlapping rights to exclude. The 
                                                 
 85.  35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006). 
 86.  Patent thickets are a version of the anticommons problem. Anticommons occur 
whenever property rights are allocated such that many parties have the right to exclude 
others from a resource and no single party has the right to use it. See Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 9, at 1611 (“[A] pure anticommons involves . . . different contributions that must 
be aggregated together”); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 698 (describing the tragedy 
of the anticommons as a situation in which “multiple owners each have a right to exclude 
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use”). Anticommons 
can arise without the overlap in rights created by invention false positives; all that is 
needed for an anticommons is that rights must be aggregated in order to use a resource. 
This may occur in the patent context when, for example, one invention incorporates several 
other invention, as often happens in the auto industry. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual 
Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1859 (2000) 
(identifying cars and consumer electronics as “multi-component products” for which an 
“individual patent[] often cover[s] . . . a single component or sub-component”). Insofar as we 
are concerned with invention false positives, though, we are concerned with overlapping 
rights, not simply rights that must be combined to be useful. So, we can restrict our focus 
to the patent thicket. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1627 (“Anticommons exist where 
several different inputs must be aggregated together to make an integrated product. 
Patent thickets, by contrast, occur when multiple intellectual property rights cover the 
same technology and therefore overlap.”). 
 87.  See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). 
 88.  See generally Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. 
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (describing the bargaining dynamic in a patent thicket). 
 89.  Id. at 127. 
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difference is that pools make the bundled patents available to third 
parties who have no patents of their own to add to the bundle.90 
 Here, again, the additional costs of a late false positive might be 
high. There is no general reason to think that parties will be more or 
less likely to enter into cross-licensing arrangements or patent pools 
after a late false positive on the invention rules. So to the extent that 
early false positives on the invention rules create thickets, those 
problems are likely to persist after late false positives. 
 3.   Summary and Caveats 
 False positives on different doctrines thus create different kinds of 
problems. It is therefore likely that the costs of false positives vary by 
doctrine too—it would be an unusual coincidence if the costs of patent 
thickets created by false positives on novelty and nonobviousness 
happened to precisely match the costs of wasteful duplication of re-
sources necessitated by false positives on enablement and best mode.  
 The relationship between timing and the costs of false positives 
also varies by doctrine. Even after late false positives on the scope 
and invention rules, we are likely to incur significant costs; therefore, 
we have reason to be concerned about compliance with those rules at 
both the early and late stages. For the disclosure and definiteness 
rules, on the other hand, we will incur little additional costs after late 
false positives. Accordingly, we have less reason to be worried about 
compliance with those rules at the late stage than we do at the early 
stage. And, as between doctrines at the late stage, we should be more 
concerned about compliance with the scope and invention rules than 
the disclosure and definiteness ones. 
 Though I have noted that the costs of false positives vary by doc-
trine, I have not indicated which doctrines produce more or less cost-
ly false positives. Doing so would require resolving highly-contested 
issues about the purposes of the patent system that are beyond the 
scope of this Article. Consider the persistent debates between pro-
spect theorists and reward theorists.91 Prospect theorists contend that 
the patent system ought to grant broad rights at the earliest possible 
time, to encourage the holders of those rights to spend resources de-
veloping them and to facilitate licensing.92 Reward theorists, on the 
                                                 
 90.  Id. Of course, cross-licensing agreements and patent pools are costly to form for all 
the reasons that thickets are problematic in the first place. They might also raise antitrust 
concerns in some contexts. Id. The point is not that these mechanisms will always solve the 
thickets problem, only that they might. 
 91.  See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for 
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). 
 92.  See id. at 132-33; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (introducing the prospect theory by analogy to mining 
prospects). 
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other hand, argue that the patent system ought to grant the narrow-
est rights possible that will provide sufficient incentive for the inven-
tor to create because narrow rights minimize deadweight losses pro-
duced by the patent monopoly.93 If prospect theory is correct, and pa-
tents are designed to grant control over a broad area of potentially 
valuable research, then false positives on utility and subject matter 
might be fairly unproblematic.94 But if reward theory is correct, and 
patents are designed to grant the lowest-cost monopoly that would 
produce an invention, then false positives on utility and subject mat-
ter may be the most troubling false positives. Similarly, it may be 
that disclosure is an essentially meaningless feature of the patent 
system, such that false positives on those doctrines are almost irrele-
vant.95 Or, it may be that disclosure is an essential part of the bar-
gain between the inventor and the public.96 Whether prospect theory 
or reward theory is right and whether disclosure is a useless append-
age or a key feature of the patent system will determine our assess-
ment of which false positives are more or less costly. I leave for an-
other day the resolution of these persistent questions in patent theory. 
 I have suggested that most of the costs of false positives on disclo-
sure and definiteness will be attributable to the early decision and 
that little harm might come from following that early mistake with a 
late false positive. That conclusion must be qualified by two general 
considerations. First, any false positive is worrisome not only for the 
specific problems it causes in any given situation, but also because it 
will increase efforts to evade the patentability rules that are the 
source of the false positive. If the patent system produces a false pos-
itive on enablement, subsequent inventors will be more likely to seek 
patents while avoiding compliance with the enablement require-
ments—they can reap the benefits of the mistake (preventing rivals 
from accessing information that could help them design cheap copies) 
without bearing the costs (wasteful duplication of resources as many 
people work to achieve the same result). The costs of false positives 
therefore include not only the direct costs of the mistake, but also the 
indirect costs of increasing efforts to produce more mistakes. A late 
false positive will be easier for third parties to observe than an early 
false positive, if only because there are many more issued patents 
                                                 
 93.  See Lemley, supra note 91, at 131. 
 94.  See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of 
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 105-08 (2003) (arguing that the subject 
matter and utility doctrines should be abolished). 
 95.  See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010) (arguing that disclosure is ancillary to the patent system’s 
main purpose of providing incentives to innovate). 
 96.  See Fromer, supra note 9 (arguing that disclosure is of central importance to the 
patent system). 
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than litigated ones.97 As a result, we should expect that early false 
positives will do little to affect the public’s incentives to evade the 
patentability rules, while late false positives (regardless of doctrine) 
may significantly increase those incentives.98  
 In addition, early false positives are easier for the patent system 
itself to fix than late false positives. Suppose an application does not 
comply with one of the patentability rules, but the patent system 
commits an early false positive and issues the patent anyway. If the 
patentee later seeks to enforce the wrongly-issued patent, the alleged 
infringer can challenge its validity, and the court therefore has the 
opportunity to produce the correct result—invalidate the patent. 
True, late false positives may also be revisited by subsequent 
courts.99 But it is less likely that a court will invalidate a patent that 
has already withstood a validity challenge.100 If we are confident in 
the patent system’s ability to self-correct, then perhaps we should not 
worry much about early false positives. The widespread concern with 
invalid patents suggests that this ability is limited,101 though, and we 
should in fact worry about early false positives. 
B.   False Negatives 
 Turn now to false negatives. The general problem posed by false 
negatives does not vary by doctrine: in all cases, false negatives re-
duce inventors’ incentives to spend money on research. Nevertheless, 
although the kind of problem does not vary by doctrine, the doctrinal 
basis for a false negative might still affect its costs by selecting for 
patents with importantly different characteristics. I explore two 
plausible characteristics—value and technological field or industry. 
Though we cannot rule out the possibility that the doctrines select for 
patents with high or low value, that possibility is not inevitable. As 
for industry, the patent system is likely applying the doctrines in 
such a way that they do select for patents in different industries; 
                                                 
 97.  Compare United States Patent and Trademark Office Patent Technology 
Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2011, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified Jan. 18, 2012) 
(noting that the PTO has issued over 185,000 patents per year since 2006 and that 247,713 
patents were issued in 2010), with Lemley, supra note 3, at 1501 (noting that only about 
one hundred cases are litigated annually). 
 98.  The visibility of the mistake is more important for false negatives, which generally 
are costly only to the extent that inventors know about them. See infra text accompanying 
notes 128-30. 
 99.  A court’s rejection of a validity challenge does not bind those who were not parties 
to the litigation; a court’s acceptance of a validity challenge does, however, bind the 
patentee. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
 100.  This is especially true when there is no new evidence to support the validity 
challenge; subject matter and utility might be contrasted with novelty and nonobviousness, 
where the discovery of new prior art may well justify a departure from a prior court’s decision. 
 101.  See supra note 1. 
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false negatives on some doctrines will therefore have industry- 
specific effects.  
 Timing also affects the costs of false negatives. Late false nega-
tives might be less costly than early ones because they ensure that 
the inventor will have had at least some period of exclusivity in 
which to appropriate returns before the patent is (wrongly) invalidat-
ed. Still, early false negatives have two underappreciated advantages 
over late ones: (1) they might make it easier for inventors to turn to 
non-patent appropriation mechanisms that can mitigate the costs of 
a false negative in any given case; and (2) they might be more diffi-
cult for third parties to observe, thereby limiting the detrimental im-
pact of false negatives on incentives to innovate. 
 1.   Doctrine as an Indirect Selection Mechanism 
 Consider the general problem posed by false negatives. Assuming 
that mistake-free application of the patentability rules would opti-
mally sort inventions that should be patented from those that should 
not, false negatives are costly because they prevent inventors from 
using patents to appropriate returns to their research investments, 
even when they are the best mechanism for doing so. 
 This view of the general problem implies that false negatives do 
not matter unless the inventor complied with all of the patentability 
rules.102 Recall that the patentability rules are all-or-nothing: if the 
inventor violates even one rule, the patent system denies her a pa-
tent.103 A true negative thus renders mistakes on other rules irrele-
vant—the patentability rules are designed to deny an inventor a patent 
if she violates any one rule, and a true negative guarantees that result.  
 For example, suppose an inventor submits an application that 
does not comply with all of the patentability rules. It satisfies the 
novelty requirement but none of the others. If the patent system per-
fectly applied the patentability rules in this scenario, it would recog-
nize that the inventor complied with the novelty requirement and 
violated all others. Because the patentability rules are all-or-nothing, 
the result is no patent. Given our baseline assumptions, this is ideal—
the rules were perfectly applied, and the inventor was denied a patent. 
 Now take the same application and suppose that the patent sys-
tem produced accurate results on all the rules, except it committed a 
false negative on novelty. The patent system correctly recognized 
                                                 
 102.   In order to isolate the effects of a false negative and to ease the exposition, I 
assume here that the patent system makes only one mistake at a time, but the analysis 
can easily be extended to multiple mistakes. See, e.g., infra note 104 (describing a 
hypothetical in which the patent system produces a false negative and a false positive on a 
single application). 
 103.  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 
(2002). 
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that the inventor violated the nonobviousness, enablement, and other 
rules, but it also wrongly concluded that the inventor violated the 
novelty rule. Again, because the patentability rules are all-or-
nothing, the result is no patent. This is precisely the same result that 
obtained with perfect application of the patentability rules.104 So the 
false negative on novelty made no difference. In both cases, the pa-
tent system reached the right result: it denied the inventor a pa-
tent.105 Accordingly, a false negative only matters if the patent sys-
tem produces true positives on all the other rules. We can therefore 
restrict our attention here to cases in which the inventor complies 
with all of the patentability rules.  
 Suppose an inventor submits an application that complies with all 
of the patentability rules—the invention is new and non-obvious, the 
description tells a person skilled in the art how to make and use the 
invention, and so on. The patent system now commits a false nega-
tive mistake on enablement—it wrongly concludes that the specifica-
tion would not tell a person skilled in the art how to make and use 
the invention.106 As a result, it denies the inventor a patent. In a per-
fect world, the inventor would have been able to use a patent to ap-
propriate returns to her invention. In this imperfect world of a false 
negative on enablement, the inventor cannot do so. Her incentives to 
invest in subsequent research projects will be diminished to the ex-
tent that she thinks that the patent system might repeat its mistake.107  
 Importantly, it would have made no difference if the false negative 
in the example occurred with respect to nonobviousness, written de-
scription, or any other patentability rule. Regardless of its doctrinal 
basis, a false negative on one rule combined with true positives on all 
others produces the same result: the inventor who should have been 
                                                 
 104.  Because the inventor has in fact violated all the patentability rules aside from 
novelty, the patent system cannot produce a false negative with respect to any rule other 
than novelty. Of course, if the inventor had complied with another rule—enablement, for 
example—the patent system could produce a false negative with respect to that rule and a 
true positive with respect to novelty. The result is the same as the case described in the 
text: the patent system rejects the application, and that’s the optimal result. So this is also 
indistinguishable from the case in which the patent system perfectly applied the 
patentability rules. We could also imagine that the patent system produces a false negative 
on novelty and a false positive on, say, subject matter. Again, the outcome is 
indistinguishable from that obtained when the patent system perfectly applies the rules—
the inventor is denied a patent. 
 105.  The same conclusion would obtain regardless of which doctrine was the source of 
the false negative error. In any case in which the patent system produces at least one true 
negative (that is, any case in which the patent system correctly determines that the 
inventor did not comply with at least one rule) and any number of false negatives, the ideal 
result and the actual result would be the same: no patent.  
 106.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 107.  And other inventors’ incentives to innovate will be diminished if they are aware of 
the false negative. This feedback effect is explored in more detail infra, text accompanying 
notes 128-30. 
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granted a patent does not get one. At first glance, then, the doctrinal 
basis of a false negative is irrelevant. 
 Still, even if the doctrinal basis of a false negative does not affect 
the kind of problem the mistake causes, it might affect the magni-
tude of the problem. This could occur if (1) the doctrines produce false 
negatives at different rates on patents that differ by important char-
acteristics and (2) inventors know about the doctrinal bases of false 
negatives. At the most general level, if some doctrines produce false 
negatives on trivial inventions and other doctrines produce false neg-
atives on important inventions, the latter will have more serious con-
sequences for innovation incentives than the former. 
 To see how systematic variation might occur, note first that false 
negatives will more likely occur on hard questions than on easy ones. 
For any given doctrine, there will likely be some patents that are 
close to the line and some that are clear-cut. Some patents will plain-
ly satisfy the nonobviousness requirement; others will force the pa-
tent system to resolve difficult technical and legal issues in order to 
evaluate whether that requirement is satisfied. And, any given pa-
tent may present hard questions on some doctrines and easy ques-
tions on others. If the rate at which patents present hard questions 
on the various doctrines depends on important characteristics of 
those patents, then the doctrinal basis of the false negative will mat-
ter. The next two subsections will consider two characteristics of inven-
tions that could plausibly be the source of systematic variation in the 
rates at which they pose hard questions on different patentability rules: 
the value of the invention and the technological field of the invention. 
 (a)   Value-Based Variation 
 We might first wonder whether the patentability rules vary with 
respect to the value of those patents that present close questions. 
Suppose there are two kinds of patents. Call one set Edison pa-
tents.108 These are very valuable patents, providing effective coverage 
over inventions that have very high market value. Call the next set 
Shark Suit patents.109 These are patents that, although valid, are 
simply not worth very much, perhaps because the inventions they 
cover have little market value. Variation in false negative rates by 
doctrine across Edison and Shark Suit patents would cause variation 
in the costs of false negatives by doctrine. Patentability rules that 
produce many Edison patent false negatives (and few Shark Suit 
ones) would have serious consequences for incentives to innovate be-
cause they increase the likelihood that inventors who make major 
                                                 
 108.  See U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1879). 
 109.  See U.S. Patent No. 4,833,729 (filed Mar. 13, 1985), reproduced in Fromer, supra 
note 96, at 600-06. 
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advances will not be compensated. Patentability rules that produce 
many Shark Suit patent false negatives (and few Edison ones) would 
have negligible consequences for incentives to innovate because they 
only increase the likelihood that inventors who make trivial contribu-
tions will not be compensated.  
 For example, we might consider the possibility that patents that 
present close questions on novelty will be systematically less valua-
ble than those that present close questions on nonobviousness. After 
all, the invention must be new before we can even consider whether 
it is an obvious variation on what is already known. If it’s not even 
clear that the invention is new, it must be quite similar to the preex-
isting state of the art and therefore of little additional value. 
 This pattern is not, however, inevitable. Consider Forest Labs., 
Inc. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc.110 That case involved the antidepressant 
Lexapro, which earned several billion dollars in revenue over its 
life111—we can think of this as a case involving an Edison patent. The 
patent covered Lexapro’s active ingredient, S-citalopram, which is 
the mirror image of another compound, R-citalopram.112 These two 
compounds are naturally found in what is known as a racemic mix-
ture—a 50-50 combination of the two mirror-image structures—and 
could not easily be separated or produced in purified form.113 One pri-
or art reference identified the racemic mixture and predicted that R-
citalopram would be more potent than S-citalopram.114 The easy 
question was nonobviousness—no one at the time thought that ob-
taining S-citalopram (as opposed to R-citalopram) would be desirable, 
and, if the field did not already possess it by virtue of the reference’s 
identification of the racemate, there was no known way to obtain it.115 
The difficult question related to novelty—whether the prior art refer-
ence, which disclosed the racemic mixture but did not provide any 
instruction on how to separate the compounds, meant that the state 
of the art included each of the purified compounds.116 This case thus 
helps show that valuable patents can pose hard novelty questions 
and easy nonobviousness ones. 
 So while there is superficial appeal to the suggestion that novelty 
false negatives occur more frequently on low-value inventions and 
                                                 
 110.  501 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 111.  Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 479, 494-95 (D. Del. 
2006). 
 112.  See Forest Labs., 501 F.3d at 1265-66. These mirror-image compounds are known 
as enantiomers. There are different ways of identifying enantiomers that produce different 
naming conventions. Here, S-citalopram is the same as (+)-citalopram and R-citalopram is 
the same as (-)-citalopram. Id. at 1265. 
 113.  See id. at 1265-67. 
 114.  Id. at 1267.  
 115.  See id. at 1269. 
 116.  See id. at 1267-69. 
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that nonobviousness false negatives occur more frequently on high-
value inventions, it is less compelling on further examination. Close 
questions on novelty generally do not arise because the alleged in-
vention is so similar to the preexisting state of the art that it’s un-
clear whether there are any differences between the two; instead, 
they arise because it is unclear what was known in the first place.117 
Close novelty questions are common when the scope of preexisting 
knowledge is difficult to ascertain ex post.118 Put differently, those 
working in the field did not realize what they (might have) had, and 
so it is unclear whether they had it at all. Because they did not real-
ize what they had (or that it mattered whether they had it), the non-
obviousness question is easy—no one would have thought to obtain 
the invention. But because no one realized the import of the inven-
tion, it is possible that it was sitting right there all along, and hence 
a close novelty question arises. 
 True, Forest Labs does not conclusively demonstrate that the pa-
tentability rules cannot produce false negatives at different rates for 
inventions of different values. It may still be the case that some pa-
tentability rules are much more likely to produce false negatives on 
Edison patents than on Shark Suit patents, and that other patenta-
bility rules have other tendencies. This is ultimately an empirical 
question, but it does not appear that variation in the value of inven-
tions that produce false negatives on different doctrines is compelled 
as a matter of logic or the structure of the patentability rules.119 
 (b)   Industry-Specific Variation 
 Although the doctrines may not generally vary with respect to the 
value of the inventions for which they produce false negatives, they 
might vary with respect to the technological field of the inventions for 
which they produce false negatives.120 Utility, for example, is almost 
never cited as a basis for a rejection outside of the chemical and bio-
logical fields, so it may produce more false negatives on chemical and 
biological patents than other ones.121 If so, false negatives on utility 
will more likely reduce incentives to invest in the chemical and bio-
logical industries than in other fields because inventors working in 
those areas have more reason to worry that excessively stringent ap-
                                                 
 117.  See Seymore, supra note 21, at 931-36 (describing difficulties in ascertaining 
whether a prior art reference is enabled for purposes of novelty analysis). 
 118.  See id. 
 119.  See Meurer, supra note 5, at 687-88 (concluding that questions about whether 
particular doctrines produce mistakes of different magnitudes are “questions for future 
empirical research”). 
 120.  See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 9 (describing cross-industry variation in 
the application of the patentability doctrines). 
 121.  Id. at 1644-46 (citing “biology and chemistry” as the “only exceptions” to the 
patent system’s general abandonment of the utility requirement). 
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plications of the rule will affect their ability to patent their inven-
tions. Similarly, the patent system might be interpreting nonobvi-
ousness such that it is difficult for software patents to meet, but easy 
for biotech patents to meet.122 If so, then false negatives on nonobvi-
ousness will more likely reduce incentives to invest in the software 
field than the biotech field. 
 This selection by industry is not compelled by the nature of the 
doctrines themselves or the structure of the patentability rules; in-
stead, it is caused by the way in which the courts are applying the 
patentability rules. We could imagine applying the utility doctrine in 
an industry-neutral way such that the utility requirement produces 
the same rate of close questions regardless of the type of invention.123 
That’s not to say that we necessarily should apply the patentability 
rules in an industry-neutral way; it is only to say that to the extent 
that we apply the rules in an industry-specific way, false negatives 
on different doctrines will have industry-specific consequences. Be-
cause the effects of false negatives on different doctrines will be indus-
try-specific, the costs of false negatives on different doctrines will vary.  
 The impact of a false negative also depends on the efficacy of non-
patent appropriation mechanisms available to inventors who are 
wrongly denied patents.124 These mechanisms—including trade se-
crecy, tacit knowledge, trademarks, and contracts—reduce the costs 
of false negatives by providing other ways for inventors to appropri-
ate returns to their inventions.125 When those mechanisms are about 
as effective as patents and are not much more costly, false negatives 
will have little effect on incentives to innovate. When those mecha-
nisms are much less effective than patents or are much more costly, 
false negatives will have significant effects on incentives to innovate. 
The efficacy of these mechanisms might vary by industry, thus com-
pounding the industry-specific selection effects of the patentability 
rules. Because the availability of non-patent appropriation mecha-
nisms also depends on the timing of the false negative, I explore that 
issue in detail in the next subsection. 
                                                 
 122.  See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002). 
 123.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1645-46 (concluding that differences in the 
application of the utility doctrine “[are] not reflected in the statute but derives ultimately 
from judicial interpretation”). 
 124.  See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (2004). 
 125.  Id. 
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 2.   Timing Effects 
 The ordinary intuition might be that early false negatives are 
more costly than late false negatives.126 Given the inventor’s compli-
ance with all of the patentability rules, we know that the optimal 
scenario would be to grant her a twenty-year patent term.127 Because 
a late false negative confers a longer period of exclusivity (from pa-
tent grant to judicial invalidation of the patent in infringement liti-
gation) than an early false negative, a late false negative comes clos-
er to the optimal scenario. All else equal, we should therefore prefer 
late false negatives. 
 This subsection complicates that intuition. First, early false nega-
tives are harder for inventors to observe than late ones. An early 
false negative is therefore less likely than a late false negative to af-
fect inventors’ beliefs about the likelihood that they will be faced with 
false negatives on future inventions. Second, early false negatives 
might facilitate inventors’ efforts to use non-patent appropriation mech-
anisms to mitigate the costs of the mistake; late false negatives might 
frustrate such efforts. As a result, we should be more willing to make 
early false negative mistakes than the ordinary intuition would suggest. 
 (a)   Observability of False Negatives 
 False negatives are costly because they affect inventors’ incentives 
to innovate. But they can only do so if inventors are aware of them. 
Generally, it will be easier for inventors to learn of late false nega-
tives than early ones. There are only about one hundred patent cases 
that make it to trial in a given year, and late false negatives will oc-
cur in a subset of those cases.128 There are over 450,000 applications 
filed annually, and early false negatives will be made on a subset of 
those.129 Whatever the actual rate of mistakes in each instance, there 
will almost surely be many more early false negatives than late ones.  
 Moreover, inventors will need to know not only that a patent has 
been invalidated or an application rejected; they will also need to as-
sess the basis for that rejection in order to know whether it was justi-
fied. It will be much easier to do so for late false negatives than early 
                                                 
 126.  Although the doctrinal basis of a false negative will likely affect its costs, the 
kinds of problems do not vary by doctrine. Accordingly, I refer here generally to false 
negatives. 
 127.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (providing for a patent term of twenty years from the date of 
filing). 
 128.  See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1501. 
 129.   See United States Patent and Trademark Office Patent Technology Monitoring 
Team, supra note 97 (reporting that over 450,000 patent applications have been filed a 
year since 2006 and that in 2010 520,277 applications were filed). Lemley and Sampat 
estimate that the PTO rejects about 17% of the unique applications it receives. Mark A. 
Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 
181, 194 (2008). 
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ones. Litigation resolving patent validity issues will often produce 
easily-accessible judicial opinions. But for most early false negatives, 
the only easily-accessible record will be a copy of the application; the 
interactions between the applicant and the examiner will typically be 
available only upon request to the PTO.130 It’s unlikely that inventors 
will take the initiative to collect and comb through the files of aban-
doned applications to see whether the patent system has produced an 
early false negative. Inventors will simply have to do much more to 
learn of early false negatives than late ones, and it is therefore likely 
that the impact of any given early false negative will be less than the 
impact of any given late false negative. 
 (b)   Availability of Non-Patent Appropriation Mechanisms 
 Early false negatives and late ones both destroy inventors’ ability 
to use the optimal appropriation mechanism provided by patent law. 
But inventors may also use non-patent appropriation mechanisms.131 
For example, an inventor might use trade secrecy to prevent rivals 
from accessing the information underlying the invention.132 The in-
ventor’s decision to apply for a patent suggests that the non-patent 
appropriation mechanisms would be less effective than a patent, but 
those mechanisms are still better than nothing. As a result, false 
negatives are somewhat problematic when they force inventors to 
resort to non-patent appropriation mechanisms; they are more prob-
lematic when those mechanisms are unavailable.  
 There are several non-patent appropriation mechanisms that an 
inventor might try to use if she were wrongly denied a patent—
foremost among them are trade secrecy, tacit knowledge, trade-
marks, and contracts.133 For each of these, the patent system’s evalu-
ations of patentability can be viewed as inputs to the inventor’s deci-
sion-making process. As the inventor develops a market-ready prod-
uct based on the invention, she must make decisions about how to 
design the product, whom to share product information with, how 
much to invest in branding, and so on. The inventor will make differ-
ent decisions based on her prediction of whether she will have a pa-
tent on her invention. If she knows she will have a patent, she will 
invest less in non-patent appropriation mechanisms; if she knows she 
                                                 
 130.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(ii) (2011) (providing access upon request to the “file of an 
abandoned application that has been published”).  
 131.  See generally Barnett, supra note 124 (discussing extra-legal protections used by 
innovators). 
 132.  See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as 
IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008) (discussing the use of trade secrets to protect 
intellectual property including technologies that could be covered by patents). 
 133.  This list is not exhaustive; other mechanisms might exist too. But these are the 
likely alternatives. 
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will not have a patent, she will invest more. So information about the 
likelihood of patent protection is a factor in her decision-making process.  
 Because the non-patent appropriation mechanisms are more effec-
tive the sooner they are adopted, the value of the patent system’s de-
cisional outputs declines over time.134 At the extreme, when the non-
patent appropriation mechanisms have become entirely unavailable 
because, for example, the information can no longer be protected by 
trade secrecy, the government’s informational output is worthless as 
an input to the inventor’s decision-making. The following subsections 
sketch out the sensitivity of each of these mechanisms to the timing 
of the false negative and note industry-by-industry variation in the 
availability of these mechanisms where appropriate.  
 (i)   Trade Secrecy 
 One non-patent appropriation mechanism that an inventor might 
use is trade secrecy. Trade secrecy and patent protection are imper-
fect substitutes.135 Like patent law, trade secrecy can prevent rivals 
from acquiring the information needed to copy the invention.136 Un-
                                                 
 134.  See generally David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375 (2011) 
(arguing that in many contexts, the value of decisional outputs by the government declines 
over time). An inventor may, of course, adopt at least some of these mechanisms at any 
time—including between the patent system’s initial grant of a patent and its late false 
negative invalidation of that patent—if she believes there is a sufficiently high risk that 
the patent system will ultimately produce a false negative. But the patent system’s goals 
are better served if inventors can abandon alternative appropriation mechanisms and rely 
instead on the patent right to exclude. In many cases where inventors seek patent 
protection, the alternative mechanisms are costly, second-best tools for solving the public 
goods problem at the heart of the justification for the patent system. In the extreme case 
where the patent system commits to only making false negatives early, if at all, inventors 
could drop alternative appropriation mechanisms as soon as they obtain patents. The 
arguments in the text illustrate the potential desirability of that extreme case but can also 
justify the less extreme case in which the patent system commits to a sufficiently high ratio 
of early false negatives to late false negatives. 
 135.  Patentable information is generally eligible for trade secret protection. See 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974) (holding that Ohio’s trade 
secret law was not preempted by federal patent law because, inter alia, “the extension of 
trade secret protection to clearly patentable inventions does not conflict with the patent 
policy of disclosure”). The converse is not true—some information that is ineligible for 
patent protection is nonetheless eligible for trade secret protection. See id. at 482-83. Also, 
though the focus in the text is on the use of the two systems as substitutes, they can also be 
used as complements, in which some of the information regarding an invention is protected 
by patent law and some by trade secrecy. I focus here on the information for which patent 
protection is optimal, as indicated by the inventor’s decision to apply for a patent on it. To 
the extent there is other information that is better protected by trade secrecy, it is outside 
the scope of this Article.  
 136.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3 (1985) (providing for injunctive and 
monetary relief for the misappropriation of trade secrets); see also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 
487-88 (noting that inventors with “a legitimate doubt as to [the] patentability” of their 
inventions may avoid patent law because of the “risk of eventual patent invalidity” and 
that “[t]rade secret protection would assist those inventors in the more efficient 
exploitation of their discoveries”); Lemley, supra note 132, at 326 (arguing that “[w]e grant 
rights over secret information for the same reason we grant rights in patent and copyright 
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like patent law, it cannot protect an inventor against rivals who ob-
tain the information by reverse engineering or independent inven-
tion.137 The inventor may have to use costlier organizational, manu-
facturing, or employment strategies to maintain a trade secret than 
to maintain a patent.138 If an inventor has applied for a patent, we 
know that perhaps because of these differences, patent protection 
would be the optimal legal regime for her invention, at least by her 
lights. But even when patent protection is best, trade secrecy may 
still be a second-best option if the patent system makes a mistake. 
 Trade secrecy is not equally effective for all inventions. It will be 
essentially useless when the invention is self-disclosing and therefore 
easy to reverse engineer.139 The classic example here is the paper 
clip.140 Everything that the rival needs to know to copy the paper clip 
is contained in the product, and so the paper clip industry (and other 
similar industries) might suffer greater harm from false negatives. 
And even if the invention is not self-disclosing, it may be costly to 
design the product so as to make reverse engineering difficult.141 
Software and consumer electronics are plausible examples of inven-
tions that can be made more or less resistant to reverse engineering 
                                                                                                                  
law—to encourage investment in the research and development that produces the 
information”). These treatments view patent and trade secret protection as alternatives 
chosen by the inventor ex ante; they do not view trade secret law as a potential remedy to 
mistakes made by the patent system. 
 137.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) (stating that 
“[i]ndependent discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not 
improper means of acquisition” of a trade secret); Lemley, supra note 132, at 319 
(“[Anyone] who acquires a trade secret by developing it on her own or by reverse 
engineering it is free to do what she wants with the secret.”).  
 138.  See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 485-86 (describing the measures necessary to 
protect a trade secret); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, 329 (arguing that reliance on 
trade secrets rather than patents “would cause inefficiencies in manufacture”); Jonathan 
M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (2011) 
(arguing that inventors who prefer to outsource production or distribution processes will 
find it easier to do so if their products are protected by patents); Peter S. Menell, 
Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 733, 739-40 (2007) (stating that because the information loses protection once it 
becomes publicly known, an inventor relying on trade secrecy might “spend an inordinate 
amount of resources on building high and impervious fences around their research 
facilities and greatly limiting the number of people with access to the proprietary 
information” and may have to pay employees more to prevent them from going to 
competitors). 
 139.  See Lemley, supra note 132, at 338-39 (arguing that self-disclosing inventions can 
be protected by patents, but not by trade secrecy); see also Katherine J. Strandburg, What 
Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 104-
18 (developing distinction between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing inventions). For 
example, the weakness of non-patent appropriation strategies for pharmaceuticals 
generally has led pharmaceutical firms simply to refuse to develop drugs that seem to have 
weak or non-existent patent positions. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the 
Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 545-56 (2009). 
 140.  Lemley, supra note 132, at 338-39. 
 141.  Id. at 338-41. 
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at some cost to the inventor.142 On the other hand, when the inven-
tion is not visible to the world and reverse engineering is very costly, 
then a false negative will have little effect.143 An example here may 
be chemical process inventions, which may be impossible to discern 
solely from observing the end result of the process.144 
 The timing of the mistake will often determine the inventor’s abil-
ity to use the second-best option of trade secrecy. Merely applying for 
a patent does not destroy the availability of trade secret protection, 
but publication of the application or issued patent does.145 Applica-
tions are typically published eighteen months after filing.146 The in-
ventor can, however, keep the application secret if she certifies to the 
PTO that she has not filed and will not file for a foreign patent cover-
ing the same invention.147 If the applicant abandons the application 
before publication, then the abandoned application remains un-
published, and the possibility of trade secrecy is preserved.148 
 A false negative that occurs before publication allows the inventor 
to use trade secrecy to mitigate the costs of the mistake. Because a 
late false negative necessarily occurs after a patent has issued, an 
inventor cannot turn to trade secret law to fix that mistake. Of 
course, if early false negatives occur after publication, then there is 
no difference in the viability of trade secrecy as a fix for early and 
late false negatives—it is simply unavailable for either. But holding 
all else equal, early mistakes are better here than late ones; inven-
tors can sometimes use trade secrecy to fix the former but can never 
use trade secrecy to fix the latter. 
 (ii)   Tacit Knowledge 
 Inventors might also try tacit knowledge strategies to deal with 
false negatives. Tacit knowledge is simply information that has not 
been written down—instead, it is acquired and transmitted by expe-
                                                 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 339-41.  
 144.  Id. at 339-40. 
 145.  4-11 CHISUM, supra note 42, § 11.02(4) (“Patent applications, pending or 
abandoned, may contain trade secrets enforceable under state law.”). Documents detailing 
the interactions between the applicant and the examiner are also provided upon written 
request. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (2011). Publication destroys the availability of trade secrecy 
because, upon publication, the information will no longer satisfy the requirement that the 
trade secret “not be[] generally known.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).  
 146.  35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.14. 
 147.  35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B). 
 148.  See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A)(i) (providing that an “application shall not be 
published if that application is . . . no longer pending”); 4-11 CHISUM, supra note 42, 
§ 11.02(4). This is true unless the inventor cites to or otherwise relies on the abandoned 
application in an issued patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(iv) (permitting publication of 
abandoned applications when they “are identified or relied upon”).  
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rience and observation.149 Tacit knowledge can be contrasted with 
codified knowledge, which is knowledge that has been written down 
or recorded and can be easily transmitted and acquired in that 
form.150 The type of information does not determine whether 
knowledge is tacit or codified; some information will be more costly to 
codify, but that does not imply that codification is impossible.151 In-
stead, inventors must choose whether the knowledge they have will 
be preserved in tacit form or converted into codified form. 
 For example, suppose an inventor designs a neurological implant 
that improves a patient’s memory. The inventor and her team will 
likely have a substantial amount of tacit knowledge regarding how to 
physically implant the device in a patient’s brain. If the inventor’s 
rivals cannot physically access her team or observe them implanting 
the device, it will be difficult for them to acquire the tacit knowledge 
needed to use the invention well.152 As this example should make 
clear, rivals may eventually acquire the knowledge themselves by 
buying the invention and conducting routine experiments with it. But 
those experiments will likely be quite costly, especially for a device 
like a neurological implant. The point of a tacit knowledge strategy is 
not that it will necessarily prevent rivals from acquiring the infor-
mation underlying the invention; instead, it is only that it will make 
it more costly for them to do so.153 
 Tacit knowledge will be more suited to some industries and inven-
tions than others. As a general rule, when the size of the potential 
market for an invention is large, it will be costlier to adopt tacit 
knowledge strategies to exclude rivals.154 Tacit knowledge strategies 
have low initial costs (because they rely on preexisting stores of 
knowledge generated during development of the invention), but high 
marginal costs (because they require the inventor to spend resources 
                                                 
 149.  See Burk, supra note 9, at 1014-16. A simple example of tacit knowledge is a tennis 
serve. See Robin Cowan & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and Diffusion of 
Knowledge, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 595, 606 (1997) (offering the tennis serve example); see 
also David Foster Wallace, Federer as Religious Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, at 
A46, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/sports/playmagazine/20federer.html 
(arguing that written language cannot convey an understanding of Roger Federer’s game 
and that only “witnessing, firsthand” will do). Reading a description of how to serve a 
tennis ball doesn’t do much to teach you how to do it; the knowledge can only be acquired 
by observation and (repeated) experience.  
 150.  Robin Cowan, Paul A. David & Dominique Foray, The Explicit Economics of 
Knowledge Codification and Tacitness, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 211, 211-12 (2000). 
 151.  Cowan & Foray, supra note 149, at 600. 
 152.  Cowan et al., supra note 150, at 222. 
 153.  See Lynn G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby & Jeff S. Armstrong, Commercializing 
Knowledge: University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in 
Biotechnology, 48 MGMT. SCI. 138, 141 (2002) (“[T]acit knowledge can be viewed as at least 
partially . . . excludable information and thus ‘appropriable’ as long as it remains difficult 
(or impossible) to learn it.”).  
 154.  See Cowan et al., supra note 150, at 222. 
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training sales representatives who then must spend time demon-
strating to customers how to use the invention).155 Codified 
knowledge strategies have the opposite profile: high initial codifica-
tion costs and low marginal costs of transmission.156 As this differ-
ence suggests, tacit knowledge strategies will work well for indus-
tries that produce inventions like medical devices, in which there is 
typically a lot of interaction between the salesperson and the custom-
er; they will work less well for industries that produce inventions like 
paper clips, in which there is typically little interaction between the 
salesperson and the customer. 
 The tacit knowledge response to a false negative is better imple-
mented sooner rather than later. The inventor of the neurological 
implant will have to decide the degree to which she will transform 
her tacit knowledge into codified knowledge by writing user manuals, 
publications for medical journals, and so on. She might prefer a codi-
fied knowledge strategy because it is cheaper if the product will be 
widely adopted, but she might be worried that the codified knowledge 
strategy will also lower her rivals’ copying costs. Moreover, if the in-
ventor launches the product using largely codified knowledge strate-
gies, she will be unable to return to a tacit knowledge strategy be-
cause the preexisting codified knowledge will be freely available to 
rivals. The inventor will have to make many such choices during the 
commercialization process. Early false negatives allow inventors to 
increase reliance on tacit knowledge during commercialization and 
product launch; late ones may come after the critical decisions are 
made. So as with the trade secrecy response, tacit knowledge will be 
a more effective appropriation tool when false negatives are made 
early rather than late. 
 (iii)   Trademarks 
 If the information underlying the invention is not susceptible to 
either trade secret or tacit knowledge strategies, another possible 
approach is to turn to trademark protection. On the conventional un-
derstanding, trademarks lower consumer search costs by letting 
them rely on experience or recommendations for information about 
product attributes.157 Once a consumer has experience with the in-
ventor’s trademarked product, she may have to pay some positive 
                                                 
 155.  See id. 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, at 174 (stating that trademarks convey 
information about the source of a product, which “economizes on search costs by lowering 
the costs of selecting goods on the basis of past experience or the recommendation of other 
consumers”). This function is especially important when a product has important 
attributes that are difficult to evaluate at the point of purchase—durability, medicinal 
efficacy, and taste are some typical examples. 
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switching costs to try a competitor’s version.158 If so, then the inven-
tor can charge that customer a price equal to the sum of the competi-
tor’s price and the customer’s switching costs.159 
 The inventor’s ability to impose switching costs on her customers 
depends on the absence of viable substitute products; if viable substi-
tutes are available, consumers will simply avoid the inventor’s prod-
ucts. This strategy thus depends on the inventor being the first to 
market. During the time between the inventor’s product launch and 
the launch of the first competing product, the inventor has some pe-
riod during which customers can experience her products but no 
competing ones. In that interim, the inventor can, if she anticipates 
competition, turn to the trademark strategy to impose switching 
costs on her customers and associate her products with her brand. 
 The importance of switching costs in purchasing decisions will 
vary; they will be most important when the trademarked products 
are either of very high or very low value.160 For low-value goods, it 
will usually not be worth it for the consumer to spend time trying to 
learn about competing products.161 For high-value goods, the risks of 
trying an alternative product may be large.162 In either of these sce-
narios, inventors can use trademarks to preserve barriers to entry. 
 This strategy will work best when the inventor can anticipate the 
launch of competing products. The inventor can use the pre-
competitive period to establish her brand—during this time, any con-
sumers who buy the product will buy her brand. The period immedi-
ately preceding a competitor’s product launch will see the inventor 
spending resources to broaden her customer base, be it through lower 
prices or increased advertising.163 Then, when competitors appear, 
the inventor will have the largest possible base of customers for 
whom switching costs are high. 
 The relationship between the trademark strategy and the timing 
of false negatives is thus subtle. Unlike trade secrecy and tacit 
knowledge, the ideal timing of the trademark strategy is related not 
to the inventor’s commercialization process and product launch, but 
                                                 
 158.  Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1477-78 (2002). Switching costs are affected by 
several conditions, including whether the customer prefers variety and whether the 
switching costs will be amortized over many purchases. See id. at 1481-84 (listing some 
factors that affect brand loyalty). 
 159.  Id. at 1478. 
 160.  See Barnett, supra note 124, at 1260-61. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 158, at 1514-15 (arguing that 
patentees will try to expand customer bases as patent expiration approaches so that they 
can use their trademarks to capture consumers with high switching costs in the post-
expiration period); see also id. at 1489-93 (describing case studies of patentees engaging in  
this strategy). 
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instead to her ability to anticipate her competitors’ product launches. 
At first glance, there does not seem to be any reason to suspect that 
the timing of a false negative will affect the inventor’s ability to an-
ticipate competing products.  
 But recall the setting of these mistakes. Early false negatives oc-
cur during prosecution of the patent, when the inventor alone is in-
teracting with the patent system. Assume that the early false nega-
tive occurs before the inventor launches her product. If so, then she 
will know when she launches the product that competitors will enter 
the market in as little time as it takes them to imitate. In contrast, 
late false negatives occur during infringement litigation. That means 
that at least one competing product has been on the market for some 
period of time.164 And that competing product launched during a peri-
od of time for which the inventor expected exclusivity—after all, the 
patent was valid and in force. Unlike an early false negative, then, a 
late false negative comes after the key moment for implementing the 
trademark strategy—the launch of a competing product. Because of 
this, it’s plausible that trademarks will be better able to fix early 
false negatives than late ones. 
 (iv)   Contracts 
 In certain instances, an inventor might also be able to form con-
tractual relationships that limit her rivals’ ability to offer cheap cop-
ies of the invention. If the invention’s functionality depends in signif-
icant part on some important input, then the inventor may be able to 
secure large portions of that input before rivals enter the market.165 
Similarly, if some distributors or resellers have an important share of 
the end user market, the inventor may again seek exclusive relation-
ships that limit market entry.166 Of course, inventions and industries 
                                                 
 164.  I set aside the possibility that the inventor will sue an alleged infringer before the 
infringer starts selling the invention due to infringing activities that occur during product 
development. Of course, such cases occur, but they are a small part of the overall picture 
given the difficulty for the patentee in detecting such infringement. 
 165.  A recent example here appears to be Apple’s strategy for its iPhone and iPad 
products. Those products require special glass for their multi-touch functionality, and 
reports suggest that Apple has formed exclusive relationships with suppliers that have 
increased barriers to entry. See Robert X. Cringely, Apple’s Money (Aug. 1, 2011, 7:30 PM), 
http://www.cringely.com/2011/08/apples-money/ (speculating that Apple is using its cash 
reserves to buy “flash RAM and iPhone displays in amounts that move whole markets and 
guarantee Apple the lowest prices anywhere” and “the most reliable supply,” such that “Apple 
has an effective consumption-side monopoly for certain mobile components.”); Matthew 
Humphries, Apple Secures 60% of World’s Touch Panel Output (Feb. 17, 2011, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.geek.com/articles/gadgets/apple-secures-60-of-worlds-touch-panel-output-20110217/ 
(describing Apple’s purchases of glass used for touch screens and the difficulty that tablet 
computer rivals have had securing cost-competitive sources). 
 166.  See Barnett, supra note 124, at 1263 (describing how “a first-mover may cultivate 
arrangements with resellers and other retail agents that may include specially tailored and 
unusually favorable contractual provisions . . . ”). 
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will vary in the degree to which important supplies or distribution 
channels are susceptible to exclusive contractual relationships. 
 Like the trademark strategy, effective use of contractual strate-
gies depends on the inventor’s ability to predict entry by her rivals. If 
competition is unlikely because a patent has been granted, then the 
inventor need not incur the potential expense of these contractual 
strategies. Once entry is on the horizon, though, these exclusive ar-
rangements may be justified. As with trademarks, then, the inventor 
can more easily use contracts to respond to an early false negative 
(which provides notice of potential entry) than a late one.  
 3.   Summary and Caveats 
 The doctrinal basis of a false negative can affect its costs by select-
ing for patents that have importantly different characteristics. The 
most plausible characteristic is the technological field of the inven-
tion. Because the courts apply the patentability rules in an industry-
specific manner, the costs of false negatives on some doctrines will 
fall especially heavily on certain industries. 
 The ordinary intuition is that, for any given patent, the appropri-
ability problem will be less severe for late false negatives than early 
ones. This is because in the case of a late false negative, the inventor 
will have had some period of exclusivity; in the case of an early false 
negative, she will have had none. The inventor’s ability to fix the ap-
propriability problem through non-patent mechanisms complicates 
that intuition. Trade secrecy, tacit knowledge, trademarks, and con-
tracts can be used to exclude rivals from the information or retain 
some market power. But because those strategies are easier to im-
plement for early false negatives than late ones, we should be less 
concerned about early false negatives than the ordinary intuition 
would suggest. Moreover, because early false negatives are less  
visible than late ones, they would seemingly have less serious  
consequences for inventors’ expectations about the likelihood of  
future mistakes. 
 I have focused on the appropriability problem the inventor faces 
following a false negative and the tools the inventor might use when 
the patent system makes mistakes. But in addition to solving that 
problem, the patent system also aims to promote dissemination of 
technical information about the invention.167 Disclosure is more im-
portant in cumulative industries, in which each invention builds on 
many other inventions, than discrete industries, in which each inven-
tion essentially stands alone.168 The non-patent appropriation strate-
                                                 
 167.  See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
 168.  Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880-84 (1990) (describing, among others, the 
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gies differ in the degree to which solving the appropriation problem 
exacerbates the dissemination problem. Successful use of trade secre-
cy and tacit knowledge limit dissemination; trademarks and contrac-
tual strategies do not affect the ability of rivals to learn about the 
invention. We might therefore be more worried about the use of trade 
secrecy and tacit knowledge strategies in cumulative industries than 
in discrete ones. In those situations, the plausible advantages of early 
false negatives will be diminished. 
IV.   IMPLICATIONS 
 The analysis thus far has described how the type, timing, and doc-
trinal basis of patent mistakes affect their costs. This Part spells out 
some implications of that analysis. I will first compare the relative 
costs of patent mistakes. I will then describe applications of this 
analysis for patent examination priorities and for the long-standing 
debate regarding the deference that courts owe to PTO decisions. 
A.   The Relative Costs of Patent Mistakes 
 As previously discussed, it is unclear whether the costs of false 
negatives on any given doctrine will be higher for early or late mis-
takes. The answer to this question depends on (1) whether the inven-
tor’s ability to use non-patent appropriation tools in response to an 
early false negative allows her to keep more of the returns to her in-
vention than the short term of exclusivity she would enjoy with a late 
false negative and (2) whether the more easily-observable nature of 
late false negatives outweighs any appropriation advantage they en-
joy over early false negatives. For present purposes, though, let us 
assume that we are in an industry in which the non-patent appropri-
ation tools are very effective for early false negatives, and the feed-
back effects of late false negatives are large.169 
 Begin with the disclosure and definiteness rules. For these, I have 
suggested some reasons to think that late false positives do not add 
much to the costs of early false positives. Combined with the possibil-
ity that early false negatives are less costly than late ones, this indi-
cates that the patent system’s late assessment of compliance with the 
disclosure and definiteness rules should be less stringent than its 
early assessment—it should be more biased in favor of false nega-
tives early rather than late. Of course, this does not mean that it 
                                                                                                                  
pharmaceutical, consumer packing, and toy industries as following a discrete innovation 
model and the aircraft and semiconductor industries as following a cumulative innovation 
model). 
 169.  Industry-by-industry variation along these dimensions suggests a possible role for 
industry-by-industry variation in how the patentability rules are applied. Cf. Burk & 
Lemley, supra note 9, at 1675-95 (arguing that courts do and should tailor the application 
of patent law on an industry-by-industry basis). 
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should be biased in favor of early false negatives over early false posi-
tives. False negatives might always be more costly than false posi-
tives, whether made early or late. The point here is simply that the 
relative assessment changes over time. Because the costs of false 
negatives increase as we move from the early assessment to the late 
one—and the costs of false positives decrease—even if we prefer false 
negatives overall, we should be less optimistic about them when 
made late rather than early, as compared to false positives. 
 I have also suggested that for the scope and invention rules, we 
cannot make any general statements about the costs of false positives 
over time. Like disclosure and definiteness, the costs of false nega-
tives on scope and invention should be higher for late mistakes than 
early ones. But the costs of false positives on these rules may also 
increase from the early assessment to the late one and may even in-
crease more than do the costs of false negatives. As a result, it is un-
clear how the relative comparison between early false positives and 
false negatives on scope and invention changes when we move to late 
false positives and false negatives. Accordingly, while the patent sys-
tem should be more willing to commit early false negatives on disclo-
sure and definiteness than late ones, there is no clear reason to suspect 
that such an approach is appropriate for scope and invention rules. 
B.   Resource Allocation 
 To make this more concrete, we might consider the following pro-
posal: the disclosure and definiteness rules should only be enforced 
by the PTO, and defendants should not be able to argue in infringe-
ment litigation that a patent is invalid for failure to comply with 
them.170 Because most of the costs of false positives on disclosure are 
incurred early in the patent’s life, and because Markman hearings 
resolve the important definitional ambiguities that make definiteness 
false positives costly, strict enforcement of these doctrines at the late 
stage does little to reduce ongoing costs while increasing the risk of 
late false negatives. Assuming the costs of late false negatives are 
high because they are highly-visible and make resort to non-patent 
appropriation mechanisms difficult, there is little to be gained from 
that increased risk.171 It therefore seems plausible that we should allo-
                                                 
 170.  The recently enacted America Invents Act implements a limited version of this 
proposal by preventing a defendant in an infringement case from using the best mode 
doctrine as a potential basis for an invalidity defense. See Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011) (providing that “the failure to 
disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled 
or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable”).  
 171.  Though a complete assessment of the costs of mistake avoidance is beyond the 
scope of this Article, we might suspect that the PTO is well-situated to evaluate at least 
the enablement and definiteness rules during examination. While the invention rules 
impose serious informational burdens on the PTO to identify relevant prior art, 
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cate relatively more resources to enforcing these rules at the PTO than 
in the courts. And, at the same time, more resources could be spent in 
litigation assessing compliance with the scope and invention rules. 
 To be sure, there are countervailing considerations. The PTO will 
inevitably make some mistakes on the disclosure and definiteness 
rules, and it may be unfair to hold defendants liable for those mis-
takes; the inventor is almost surely the lowest-cost avoider, so it 
makes sense to ensure that she has good incentives to avoid them. 
Moreover, the adversarial nature of litigation might be well-suited to 
correcting PTO mistakes on these doctrines. The proposal does illus-
trate, however, a concrete way to apply the results of the analysis here.  
C.   The Presumption of Validity 
 In a similar vein, consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership.172 The Court held that an al-
leged infringer must demonstrate that a patent is invalid by clear 
and convincing evidence.173 It also rejected the possibility that the 
lower preponderance standard would apply if the defendant present-
ed evidence that was not available to the PTO.174 But the Court nonethe-
less allowed that “the challenger’s burden to persuade the jury of its in-
validity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be easier to sus-
tain” with new evidence than with evidence that was before the PTO.175 
 Implicit in this suggestion is a doctrine-specific approach to the 
presumption of validity. New evidence will often take the form of ref-
erences that show the state of the art was more advanced than the 
PTO had thought; the patent is therefore more likely to have violated 
the invention rules. But it would be a rare case in which new evi-
dence of invalidity affects the assessment of whether the patent com-
plies with the disclosure and definiteness rules because that assess-
ment is largely conducted within the four corners of the patent doc-
ument. As a result, the evidentiary burden the defendant must over-
come to demonstrate invalidity on the disclosure and definiteness 
rules will never be “easier to sustain,” but his burden to demonstrate 
invalidity on the invention rules might be.  
 The Court’s approach might be partially justified by the difference 
between the invention rules on the one hand and the disclosure and 
definiteness rules on the other. As described here, for the disclosure 
and definiteness rules, we should be more tolerant of false positives 
than false negatives at the late stage compared to our tolerance at 
                                                                                                                  
enablement and definiteness are self-contained inquiries, requiring only that the examiner 
understand what’s written in the patent document itself. 
 172.  131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 173.  Id. at 2242, 2244. 
 174.  Id. at 2244. 
 175.  Id. at 2251. 
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the early stage; we lack, however, a good reason to take the same ap-
proach for the invention rules. Lowering the presumption of validity 
for the invention rules, but not for the disclosure and definiteness 
rules, implements essentially this idea. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article has assessed how three important characteristics af-
fect the costs of patent mistakes. Those characteristics—type, timing, 
and doctrinal basis—make some mistakes more worrisome than oth-
ers. Because empirical evidence on the costs of patent mistakes is 
difficult to acquire, the design of the patent system must flow from 
theoretical arguments. Of course, the arguments here are incom-
plete—I have not, for example, resolved the debate about the role of 
disclosure in the patent system. Nor have I said much about the costs 
of mistake-avoidance; a complete analysis of patent mistakes would 
include not only the costs of the mistakes, but also the costs of avoid-
ing them. Still, I have evaluated one side of the ledger and spelled 
out some of the intuitions that would lead us to favor some mistakes 
over others. The arguments presented here, which are based on areas 
of widespread agreement within patent theory, thus suggest a way 
forward through an inherently uncertain and hotly contested area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
